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The role of the judiciary has been noticeably absent from discussions
about solutions to the foreclosure crisis. This Article argues that state
courts have an opportunity to meaningfully intervene in the foreclosure
process by addressing the competing financial interests of mortgage
servicers and the absent securities investors whom servicers represent
in foreclosure proceedings. Under the depressed housing market
conditions following the economic collapse of 2006-07, foreclosure
resulted in more than a ten-fold average loss in loan value compared
with modification, according to some estimates. This Article proposes
that state courts utilize pre-foreclosure mediation programs to ensure
that foreclosure is in the best interests of absent investors before
permitting foreclosure to proceed. Unlike foreclosure defense and other
palliative measures, widespread mortgage modification has the
potential to immediately reduce the foreclosure rate and resolve
borrower default, prerequisites to stabilizing mortgage markets and the
broader economy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As the country struggles to recover from the recent collapse of
the housing market, there is general agreement that the number of
foreclosures needs to be reduced in the short term and that the
mortgage lending system must be recalibrated to cure its dysfunction
and facilitate sustainable homeownership over the long term.'
Nevertheless, neither the executive nor the legislative branch of the
federal government has implemented effective national policy
solutions.
Hope for Homeowners, a 2008 Bush administration plan,
promised to prevent 400,000 foreclosures but delivered only twenty-
five loan refinances.2 President Barack Obama's $75 billion
Homeowner Stability initiative, launched in early 2009, has failed to
meet its goal to generate three to four million mortgage
modifications.' As of January 31, 2010, the program had produced
only 116,000 permanent modifications. Moreover, proposed
legislation to empower bankruptcy judges to modify mortgages on
primary residences has stalled multiple times in Congress.'
The role of the judiciary has been noticeably absent from
discussions about solutions to the mortgage crisis. Policymakers
have overlooked the critical role state courts play in the foreclosure
process. Given the structural opportunity for them to meaningfully
intervene in the foreclosure process, it is imperative to question why
the state courts have not taken more decisive action to mitigate the
1. John Spence, US Housing Market Recovery Damped by Still-Rising Delinquencies,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2009; Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Edmund L. Andrews, $275 Billion Plan
Seeks to Address Housing Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2009, at Al; David Wessel, Preventing
the Next Fire While This One Blazes, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2009, at A2; Jack Healy, Bernanke
Calls for More Help for Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/
12/05/business/economy/05fed.html? r-l &scp=2&sq=&st=nyt.
2. Brian Grow, Keith Epstein & Robert Bemer, The Home Foreclosure Fiasco: How the
Banking Industry Is Undermining Efforts to Keep People in Their Houses, BUS. WK., Feb. 23,
2009, at 34.
3. See Ruth Simon, Mortgage Program Gathers Steam After Slow Start, WALL ST. J., Nov.
11, 2009, at A6.
4. James R. Hagerty, More Receive Help to Avert Foreclosures, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18,
2010, at A7.
5. See Stephen Labaton, Senate Refuses to Let Judges Fix Mortgages in Bankruptcy, N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 2009, at B3. A second attempt to pass this legislation also failed. See Dawn
Kopecki, Mortgage 'Cram-Down'Amendment Fails in US. House, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 11, 2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=azB6PD4NAPSs&pos=3.
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foreclosure crisis and to consider what state courts should be doing
to that end.
This Article argues that state courts failed, or were unable, to
limit the magnitude of the foreclosure crisis for two principal
reasons. First, foreclosure defense does not effectively reduce
foreclosures because it involves numerous practical barriers and
generally does not resolve borrower default, thus delaying, rather
than preventing, foreclosures. Second, state courts have not done
enough to encourage mortgage modification, which has the potential
to substantially mitigate the foreclosure crisis. In particular, state
courts have failed to apply objective standards and vigorous judicial
oversight to mandatory pre-foreclosure mediation programs designed
to encourage mortgage modification. In their current form, these
programs fail to regulate the behavior of mortgage servicers, who
generally prefer foreclosure to modification even though such
behavior, under current market conditions, entails significant
financial losses for securities investors.
This Article proposes that to reduce foreclosures, state courts
should recognize a duty to protect securities investors-primary
stakeholders in foreclosure litigation, though absent from
proceedings-from the competing interests of mortgage servicers. To
implement this duty, state courts should require mortgage servicers
to utilize a readily available economic formula-the net present
value calculation-to prove that foreclosure is in the best interests of
investors prior to permitting the foreclosure action to proceed
through the court system.
Part II provides background on traditional foreclosure law and
how it has been reconfigured by modem mortgage securitization.
Part III discusses why state courts have not been effective in limiting
the magnitude of the foreclosure crisis. Part IV proposes that state
courts recognize a judicial duty to protect the financial interests of
absent stakeholders. This part first examines other areas of the law in
which courts have recognized a duty to protect absent stakeholders.
It then argues that state courts should adopt a similar doctrinal
approach in the foreclosure context by blocking mortgage servicers
from foreclosing unless servicers show that foreclosure is in the best
interests of absent investors. Part V concludes.
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II. THE ROAD TO CRISIS: FORECLOSURE LAW AND THE
RISE OF THE MORTGAGE SERVICER
State foreclosure laws aim to minimize the cost of credit by
providing mortgage holders with an economically efficient route to
recover collateral on nonperforming debt while also protecting
borrowers against erroneous, fraudulent, or premature deprivation of
property.6 While this balancing has undergone periodic recalibration
by state lawmakers over the years, most state foreclosure laws have
not been substantially updated since the advent of mortgage
securitization.' After it developed the 1980s, mortgage securitization
expanded aggressively in the 1990s, and culminated in the collapse
of the housing market in 2007. The resulting high rate of
foreclosure' has undermined national and global economies and
adversely affected neighborhoods and cities by reducing surrounding
property values, increasing crime, and eroding municipal tax bases."o
State courts are positioned at the juncture between antiquated
foreclosure laws and modem securitization practices. The interaction
between these two institutional forces frames the problems state
courts face in responding to the foreclosure crisis. Securitization
injects new actors into the mortgage process who were not
6. See Patrick B. Bauer, Judicial Foreclosure and Statutory Redemption: The Soundness of
Iowa's Traditional Preference for Protection over Credit, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1, 12-13 & n.40
(1985); see also Nguyen v. Calhoun, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 436, 446 (Ct. App. 2003).
7. See JOHN RAO & GEOFF WALSH, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FORECLOSING A
DREAM 8-9 (2009), available at http://www.consumerlaw.org/issues/foreclosure/content/FORE-
Report0209.pdf.
8. See generally Prentiss Cox, Foreclosure Reform Amid Mortgage Lending Turmoil: A
Public Purpose Approach, 45 HOuS. L. REV. 683 (2008); Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How
Securitization Caused the Subprime Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REv. 1257 (2009); Lauren E. Willis,
Will the Mortgage Market Correct? How Households and Communities Would Fare If Risk Were
Priced Well, 41 CONN L. REV. 1177 (2009); Kristopher S. Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, Subprime
Mortgages, Foreclosures, and Urban Neighborhoods (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working
Paper No. 2009-1, 2009); Ivo Pezzuto, Miraculous Financial Engineering or Toxic Finance? The
Genesis of the U.S. Subprime Mortgage Loans Crisis and Its Consequences on the Global
Financial Markets and Real Economy (Swiss Mgmt. Ctr., Working Paper No. 1662-761X, 2008).
9. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
10. See Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The External Costs of Foreclosure: The Impact of
Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values, 17 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 57, 57-
60 (2005) (finding "that each conventional foreclosure within [one] eighth of a mile of a single-
family home results in a 0.9 percent decline in the value of that home" and noting study that
found city costs of $27,000 per foreclosure); Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The Impact of
Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Neighborhood Crime, 21 HOUSING STUD. 851, 862
(2006) (calculating that a 1 percent increase in the foreclosure rate in a census tract yields a
corresponding 2.33 percent increase in violent crime rate).
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contemplated by traditional foreclosure law, significantly influencing
the way legal foreclosure procedures affect borrowers, investors, and
the mortgage market generally.
A. The Basic Borrower-Lender Relationship:
Mortgage and Promissory Note
A home mortgage loan is a debt obligation secured by
residential real estate." The borrower agrees that failure to meet
payment obligations will empower the lender to force sale of (or take
title to) the property through foreclosure.12 Loan origination produces
two related documents: the promissory note and the mortgage.13 The
promissory note is a contract defining the mutual rights and
obligations of the borrower and lender, including the borrower's duty
to pay, total debt owed, interest rate calculation, payment schedule,
and monthly payment amount.1
The mortgage is a security interest that is activated when a
borrower fails to tender timely payments-thereby defaulting on the
mortgage-and enables the mortgage holder to foreclose to satisfy
the debt defined in the promissory note. Almost every promissory
note contains an acceleration clause that renders the full mortgage
debt due upon borrower default." Aside from some mitigating
doctrines," once a lender properly invokes the right to acceleration, a
borrower must either arrange payment of the remaining loan balance
in full or lose the real estate to foreclosure.
11. ROBERT KRATOVIL, MODERN MORTGAGE LAW AND PRACTICE § 1, at 23 (1972).
12. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009); see also GRANT S. NELSON & DALE
A. WHITMAN, 1 REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 1.1, at 1-2 (4th ed. 2002).
13. See JOHN RAO ET AL., NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FORECLOSURES § 4.3.4.1, at 81
(2d ed. 2007). Some states use deeds of trust instead of mortgages as the controlling security
instrument. Because there is little practical difference between the two, this Article uses the term
"mortgage" exclusively even if a particular state employs deeds of trust. Id. § 4.5, at 90 (noting
that deeds of trust, unlike mortgages, give rise to a fiduciary duty between trustee and borrower).
The term "mortgage" is also often used as a general descriptor of the entire mortgage lending
relationship, including both the promissory note and the security instrument. See, e.g., CAL. CIV.
CODE § 2920 (West 2009). This Article will use the term "mortgage" in its general sense unless
referring to "mortgage" in the specific sense of a security instrument.
14. RAO ET AL., supra note 13, § 10.2.3, at 260.
15. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 12, § 7.6, at 615.
16. See infra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing reinstatement).
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B. Securitization Fragments Mortgage Players and Interests
The past two decades have seen two significant transformations
in the mortgage market-the fragmentation of loan ownership
through mortgage securitization and a corresponding increase in the
riskiness of mortgage lending. Instead of making only safe loans to
low-risk borrowers, as had generally been done in the past," lenders
increasingly made loans to high-risk borrowers at correspondingly
higher rates."
In a typical securitization process, investment banks purchase
individual mortgages from originating lenders and aggregate them
into a mortgage pool. The mortgage pool is transferred to a trust
created to hold the mortgages and to enable the investment bank to
issue mortgage-backed securities to investors on the open market.20
The securitization trust is established contractually by the pooling
and servicing agreement (PSA), a document that defines the rights
and duties of the participants in the securitization process.21
Investors who purchase securities can acquire interests in
different segments, or tranches, of the mortgage pool that correspond
to various "slices" of mortgage payments.22 One tranche might
represent principal repayments during the first few years of the
mortgages in the trust, while another might represent interest
payments over the lifespan of the mortgages.23 Tranches are also
tiered by payment priority with subordinate tranches first in line to
17. Under the traditional mortgage-lending model, banks would typically extend standard
30-year fixed-rate mortgages and retain them over their full terms, creating a lasting relationship
with borrowers. See Willis, supra note 8, at 1206-07. Access to mortgage credit was limited to
low-risk borrowers because the originating lender bore the risk of borrower default. See id. at
1206-08.
18. See id. at 1213; Eggert, supra note 8, at 1272. Prior to the 2007 mortgage-market
collapse, subprime lending was touted as expanding access to homeownership to lower-income
borrowers and minorities. See Willis, supra note 8, at 1195.
19. Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185,
2208-09 (2007); see also Eggert, supra note 8, at 1266.
20. See Peterson, supra note 19, at 2208-09. The business entity used to securitize
mortgages, called a special purpose vehicle, can be a corporation, partnership, or limited liability
company, but usually is a trust. Id. at 2209.
21. See RAO ET AL., supra note 13, § 1.2.2.3, at 7.
22. See Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the
Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 539-40 (2002).
23. See id. at 562; U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Collateralized Mortgage Obligations
(CMOs), http://www.sec.gov/answers/tcmos.htm (last visited June 4, 2010); The Sec. Indus. and
Fin. Mkts. Ass'n, Types of Bonds: The Various Types of CMOs, http://www.investingin
bonds.com/learnmore.asp?catid=5&subcatid=17&id=35 (last visited June 4, 2010).
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absorb losses from reduced mortgage payments. 24 Tranches are often
resecuritized, creating securities backed by other securities rather
than mortgages.25
Mortgage securitization splits the unitary mortgage owner into a
dispersed cloud of investors who are collectively unable to make
decisions about particular loans and a passive loan pool trustee.2 6 In
need of a mortgage management mechanism, investors must rely on
mortgage servicers. 27 The servicer's duties and compensation are
defined by the PSA 2 8 and include collecting and distributing
mortgage payments to investors, paying property taxes from escrow
accounts, verifying insurance coverage, and executing foreclosure or
workout agreements29 on borrower default." The servicer plays a
critical intermediary role in the mortgage process. It is likely the only
party with which the borrower has any direct contact and is
responsible for making decisions about the mortgage on behalf of
investors." As explained infra, the structural characteristics of
mortgage securitization and foreclosure create incentives for
mortgage servicers to prefer foreclosure over modification even
when it is financially detrimental to investors.32
24. Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout
Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 1075, 1098 (2009).
25. Id. at 1100 (discussing recursively structured collateralized mortgage obligations
(CMOs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)).
26. A pool trustee is little more than a passive legal placeholder, a "passive synthetic
creature whose only purpose is to funnel highly specified cashflows to investors." Id. at 1092; see
also Kurt Eggert, Limiting Abuse and Opportunism by Mortgage Servicers, 15 HOUSING POL'Y
DEBATE 753, 754 (2004). Mortgage-pool trusts are structured as automatic revenue "pass-
throughs" to avoid adverse tax and regulatory consequences. See Gelpem & Levitin, supra note
24, at 1096-98 & n.85.
27. See Gelpem & Levitin, supra note 24, at 1088; Christopher Foote et al., Reducing
Foreclosures: No Easy Answers 21 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper No. 2009-15,
2009).
28. RAO ET AL., supra note 13, § 1.2.2.3, at 7; Alan M. White, Deleveraging the American
Homeowner: The Failure of2008 Voluntary Mortgage Contract Modifications, 41 CONN. L. REV.
1107, 1127 (2009).
29. See infra Part II.E.
30. Eggert, supra note 26, at 755; Gelpem & Levitin, supra note 24, at 1088.
31. See RAO ET AL., supra note 13, § 2.2.4.3, at 26. A borrower has almost no control over
which entity services her mortgage. See Eggert, supra note 26, at 767.
32. See infra Part III.B.L.
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C. Foreclosure Crisis: The Chain ofPlausible Deniability
Securitization also changed which party bears the cost of bad
lending practices. Under the holder in due course doctrine, the
securitization process creates a "chain of plausible deniability" that
shields mortgage holders and investors from liability for any
fraudulent and predatory practices of the original lender.33
Untethered from the risk of borrower default, brokers and lenders
aggressively deployed an array of non-traditional loan products34 to
induce high volumes of high-risk subprime borrowers to obtain
mortgages that were then sold down the securitization stream for a
profit." Almost three million subprime loans were originated in 2006
alone.36
The profitability of these practices and a seemingly perpetual
period of housing price increases led to an overextension of risky
credit. Credit markets collapsed in 2007 after funds heavily
invested in subprime mortgage products imploded from high rates of
default and foreclosure." Housing prices plummeted,"3 eroding home
equity that many subprime borrowers needed to refinance out of
resetting adjustable-rate mortgages,4 0 thereby fueling increases in the
33. Eggert, supra note 22, at 552; see also Raymond Brescia, Capital in Chaos: The
Subprime Mortgage Crisis and the Social Capital Response, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 271, 309
(2008). Although the holder in due course doctrine developed in the nineteenth century, it has
assumed new significance in the age of securitization. See Eggert, supra note 22, at 566-7 1; Ann
M. Burkhart, Lenders and Land, 64 MO. L. REv. 249, 262-63 (1999).
34. See RAO ET AL., supra note 13, § 1.2.5, at 11-13.
35. See Gelpem & Levitin, supra note 24, at 1084. Lending institutions that securitize
mortgages make money from up-front fees rather than interest-payment streams. Id. Borrowers
have limited recourse for predatory lending practices because the holder in due course doctrine
insulates investors from any defects not apparent on the face of the documents. Although lenders
must make representations and warranties to investors that, if violated, obligate the lender to buy
back loans, such recourse is little comfort if the originating lender has gone bankrupt. Eggert,
supra note 22, at 548-49. Many lenders have gone bankrupt in recent years. Oren Bar-Gill, The
Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1073,
1129 & n.196 (2009).
36. Bar-Gill, supra note 35, at 1074.
37. See Eggert, supra note 8, at 1259-61.
38. See Alan M. White, Rewriting Contracts, Wholesale: Data on Voluntary Mortgage
Modifications from 2007 and 2008 Remittance Reports, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509, 513 (2009);
White, supra note 28, at 1109.
39. Les Christie, Home Prices Fall Another 2.5%, CNNMONEY.COM, Feb. 23, 2010,
http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/23/realestate/2009_Case-Shillerreport/?postversion=20 100
22312 (reporting 32 percent drop in housing prices between the second quarter of 2006 and the
first quarter of 2009).
40. Eggert, supra note 8, at 1260 (citing estimate of $3.3 trillion loss in homeowner equity in
2008).
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foreclosure rate.4 1 As the national economy dipped into recession,
unemployment rose to its highest level since 1983.42 With
unemployment also at its longest average duration on record,43 the
scope of the crisis extended to all classes of borrowers, even those
with low-risk prime mortgages."
In the second quarter of 2009, the national rate of residential
mortgages either delinquent or in foreclosure rose to a record-high
13.16 percent, or more than one in eight households with a
mortgage.4 5 In total, out of the approximately 51 million mortgaged
residential units in the United States,46 approximately 2.15 million
foreclosures were completed from July 2007 to October 2009.47
Looking to the horizon, foreclosure starts are projected to reach eight
to thirteen million by 2013.48
D. Foreclosure: An Equitable Remedy Shaped by State Law
Foreclosure is an equitable remedy,49 although foreclosure
procedures are defined by state law." The foreclosure process begins
when a borrower fails to make several monthly mortgage payments
41. See RAO ET AL., supra note 13, § 1.2.5, at 13; White, supra note 38, at 522-25.
42. Neil Irwin & Michael A. Fletcher, Nation's Jobless Rate Tops 10 Percent; Surge to 26-
Year High Puts Damper on Signs That Recession Is Over, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2009, at Al.
43. Mortimer Zuckerman, The Economy Is Even Worse Than You Think, WALL ST. J., July
14, 2009, at A13 (reporting that the average length of official unemployment had reached 24.5
weeks, the longest duration since the government began tracking this data in 1948).
44. See Peter S. Goodman & Jack Healy, Work Losses Hit Mortgages Seen as Safe, N.Y.
TIMES, May 25, 2009, at Al; see also HOPE Now, APPENDIX - MORTGAGE LOSS MITIGATION
STATISTICS INDUSTRY EXTRAPOLATIONS (AS OF Q3-2009) (2009), https://www.hopenow.com/
industry-data/HOPE%20NOW%2ONational%2OData%2OJulyO7%20to%200ct09%20v6%
20All.pdf.
45. Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, Delinquencies Continue to Climb, Foreclosures
Flat in Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey (Aug. 20, 2009), http://www.mbaa.org/
NewsandMedia/PressCenter/70050.htm.
46. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, FORECLOSURE CRISIS: WORKING TOWARD A
SOLUTION 7 (2009).
47. HOPE NOW, supra note 44.
48. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, TAKING STOCK: WHAT HAS THE TROUBLED
ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM ACHIEVED? 63 & n.240 (2009).
49. See FLA. STAT. § 702.01 (2010); KRATOVIL, supra note 11, §§ 525-42, at 331-36; RAO
ET AL., supra note 13, § 6.4.5.4 (Supp. 2009); Steven Seidenberg, Homing in on Foreclosure,
A.B.A. J., July 2008, at 54, 57; Debra Pogrund Stark, Foreclosing on the American Dream: An
Evaluation of State and Federal Foreclosure Laws, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 229, 231-32 (1998).
50. See RAO ET AL., supra note 13, § 4.2.1, at 75.
1393
LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLA WREVIEW [Vol. 43:1383
and the mortgage holder" determines that the borrower defaulted.52
While each state maintains its own unique set of foreclosure rules,
most state schemes fall into one of two categories: judicial and
nonjudicial.3
1. Judicial and Nonjudicial Foreclosure
The judicial foreclosure process is similar to other civil
adjudications. The foreclosing party must file a complaint 4 and serve
the borrower and other related parties with notice to initiate
foreclosure proceedings." The borrower must then file an answer to
avoid default judgment.56 After payment default but before
foreclosure proceedings, many states provide a reinstatement period
during which the borrower has a right to cure the default by bringing
5 1. Note on terminology: when referring to the entity pursuing foreclosure, this Article will
use the term "foreclosing party." This entity could be a lender, servicer, nominee, trustee, or other
authorized agent for the mortgage holder, although it is most often the servicer. It is also
important to distinguish between the "mortgage originator," which is the original lending
institution, and the present mortgage holder. The identity of the mortgage holder is often unclear
to borrowers, courts, and even the foreclosing party itself. This Article will refer to the specific
type of entity or agent when known or appropriate. Because this Article focuses on residential
foreclosure, this Article will use the terms "borrower" and "homeowner" interchangeably.
52. See RAO ET AL., supra note 13, § 6.4.2, at 160-61. While payment delinquency is the
principal reason for borrower default, failure to perform other obligations under the mortgage
contract, such as maintaining insurance and paying property taxes, can also lead to default. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES §§ 4.6(b)(1), (c), 8.1 cmt. a (1997).
53. All states have a procedure for judicial foreclosure. RAO ET AL., supra note 13, § 4.2.1,
at 75. Nonjudicial foreclosure by power-of-sale is only permitted in twenty-six states and the
District of Columbia. Id. § 4.2.3, at 76. There are other infrequently used forms of foreclosure
allowed in a few states, including strict foreclosure and foreclosure by entry and possession. See
id. § 4.2.4, at 77. The remaining states require judicial foreclosure. See id. § 4.2.1, at 76.
54. See id. § 4.2.2, at 76. The complaint in foreclosure proceedings usually must be filed in a
court in the county in which the property sits. See PATRICK MEARS ET AL., STRATEGIES FOR
SECURED CREDITORS IN WORKOUTS AND FORECLOSURES § 4.01, at 157 (2004); RAO ET AL.,
supra note 13, § 4.2.2, at 76.
55. In addition, the foreclosing party must file a lis pendens-a notice of impending
foreclosure-with the county recorder. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 12, at 1015;
see also Debra Pogrund Stark, Facing the Facts: An Empirical Study of the Fairness and
Efficiency of Foreclosures and a Proposal for Reform, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 639, 644
(1997). While states vary regarding the number and timing of notice requirements, most states
mandate that the foreclosing party follow them strictly. See RAO ET AL., supra note 13, § 4.2.3, at
76 n.9, § 4.3.2, at 79 n.35. For more information on the complexities of state notice requirements,
see generally SIDNEY A. KEYLES, ABA SECTION ON REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST
LAW, FORECLOSURE LAW & RELATED REMEDIES: A STATE BY STATE DIGEST (1995).
56. See, e.g., Georgina W. Kwan, Mortgagor Protection Laws: A Proposal for Mortgage
Foreclosure Reform in Hawai'i, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 245, 249-50 (2001).
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payments current and covering the foreclosing party's fees and
costs.5"
If the borrower is unable to cure the default, the case proceeds
through the court system with the judge sitting as fact-finder." The
foreclosing party usually files a motion for summary judgment
claiming it has met the state's foreclosure requirements.59 In most
states, the foreclosing party's prima facie case is composed of three
elements: (1) proof of a valid mortgage between the parties; (2) proof
that the foreclosing party owns the unpaid promissory note;"o and (3)
evidence that the borrower is in default."1 In response to the motion
for summary judgment, the borrower has an opportunity to present
defenses and counterclaims to defeat the motion. These can include
failure to adhere to procedural prerequisites, mistakes and
improprieties in charging and collecting fees, mishandling payments,
and other errors or misconduct.6 2 The judge will then issue a decree
authorizing a foreclosure sale or dismiss the foreclosure action.63
Nonjudicial foreclosure, as the term itself implies, requires little
or no court involvement.64 In states permitting nonjudicial
foreclosure, most mortgages contain a power-of-sale clause
authorizing the mortgage holder to initiate and execute foreclosure
upon borrower default without any prior judicial order. 65 The
borrower in a nonjudicial foreclosure state can redirect the
foreclosure process into the state court system. Yet the borrower
57. RAO ET AL., supra note 13, § 4.2.5, at 77-78 (noting that at least nineteen states and the
District of Columbia provide a right to cure default through reinstatement).
58. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 702.01 (2010).
59. See RAO ET AL., supra note 13, § 4.2.2, at 76 & n.5.
60. However, many state courts have adopted a relaxed attitude towards proving ownership
of the note. See infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
61. See Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Massimo, 2006 WL 1477125, at *2 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. May 26, 2006); Republic Nat'l Bank of N.Y. v. Zito, 280 A.D.2d 657, 658
(N.Y. App. Div. 2001); Norwest Bank Minn., N.A. v. Biscello, No. 98AP-1245, 2000 WL
1693404, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2000); MANUEL FARACH, Form Complaint for Mortgage
Foreclosure and Money Judgment, in FLORIDA REAL ESTATE § 28:12 (West's Fla. Practice
Series Vol. 19, 2009-2010 ed.); see also RAO ET AL., supra note 13, § 4.2.2, at 76.
62. See Eggert, supra note 26, at 756-61; see also RAO ET AL., supra note 13, § 4.2.2, at 76.
63. See RAO ET AL., supra note 13, § 4.2.2, at 76.
64. See RAO ET AL., supra note 13, § 4.2.3, at 76; Cox, supra note 8, at 700.
65. See RAO ET AL., supra note 13, § 4.2.2, at 76; Cox, supra note 8, at 700.
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bears the burden of filing for and securing a preliminary injunction to
stop the foreclosure sale from continuing.6 6
Mortgage holders typically prefer nonjudicial foreclosure
because it avoids the delay (and expense) associated with instituting
court action, which can be considerable." Although numbers vary
depending on the jurisdiction and the caseloads in the courts, one
source estimates that on average nonjudicial foreclosure takes less
than two months, whereas judicial foreclosure takes about eight
months.68 However, mortgage holders sometimes prefer judicial
foreclosure when state law requires this method of foreclosure to
obtain a post-sale deficiency judgment.6 9
2. Borrower's Response: Right of Redemption,
Bankruptcy, and Post-Sale Challenge
Both judicial and nonjudicial foreclosures conclude with the
foreclosure sale." Prior to the foreclosure sale, all states give the
borrower the opportunity to avoid foreclosure by exercising the
equitable right of redemption." The equitable right of redemption
involves paying the mortgage holder the total outstanding balance on
66. See RAO ET AL., supra note 13, § 4.2.3, at 77. This typically includes posting a security
bond. Id. § 4.2.3, at 77, § 10.5, at 268-69.
67. See KAREN PENCE, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FORECLOSING ON
OPPORTUNITY: STATE LAWS AND MORTGAGE CREDIT 5 (2003) (discussing 1996 study
suggesting that delaying foreclosure for sixteen months on $100,000 loan increased costs by more
than $13,500); see also Stark, supra note 55, at 646.
68. According to a study in the mid-1990s, the median time to complete a power-of-sale
foreclosure was fifty-six days compared to eight months for judicial foreclosure. Stark, supra
note 49, at 232 n.10, 257-67 tbl.1; see also PENCE, supra note 67, at 5 (discussing 1997 study
finding that judicial foreclosure takes 148 days longer than nonjudicial foreclosure on average
and that the difference in average duration between the slowest judicial foreclosure state (Maine)
and the fastest nonjudicial foreclosure state (Texas) was 300 days).
69. See Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1404-06 (2004). When a defaulting borrower
has assets in addition to the property in foreclosure, a deficiency judgment enables the mortgage
holder to recover the difference between the borrower's outstanding debt and the price paid for
the property at the foreclosure sale. Id. Some states prohibit deficiency judgments after
nonjudicial foreclosure. Id. Deficiency judgments are more often pursued against commercial
borrowers because most residential borrowers have too few resources to make deficiency
judgment profitable. See PENCE, supra note 67, at 6. In general, any surplus from the foreclosure
sale is returned to the borrower, assuming there are no other valid liens wiped out by the
foreclosure which must first be satisfied. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 12, § 7.31, at
726-28.
70. See RAO ET AL., supra note 13, §§ 4.2.2-3, at 76-77.
71. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 12, § 3.1, at 34-35.
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the loan plus any expenses the mortgage holder incurred in
administering the default.7 2
A common strategy for borrowers facing imminent foreclosure
is to file for bankruptcy, which invokes an automatic stay and halts
the foreclosure process." However, bankruptcy court is only a detour
in most foreclosure cases because mortgages on primary residences
are not eligible for bankruptcy restructuring.74 Unless the borrower
proves a defense to foreclosure or finds a way to settle the mortgage
debt during the automatic stay, the foreclosure action will ultimately
be returned to, and executed in, state court.
After a foreclosure sale occurs, a borrower faces extreme
difficulty in convincing the court to set the sale aside. 6 Courts
disfavor post-sale challenges to foreclosure because such a challenge
prejudices a subsequent purchaser who has paid for the property and
is unaware of any defects in the foreclosure process.
E. Mortgage Modification and Other Negotiated
Pre-Foreclosure Alternatives
Borrower default does not inevitably lead to foreclosure. In
addition to reinstatement or redemption, there are a variety of pre-
foreclosure alternatives, sometimes called "workout agreements" or
"loss mitigation." 78 The mortgage holder may agree to a short sale,
which enables the borrower to resolve the default by selling the
72. See id. In addition to the equitable right of redemption, some states allow a statutory
right of redemption. This right extends the redemption period for a time after the foreclosure sale
and gives the borrower the right to buy back property sold at a foreclosure from the purchaser for
the foreclosure sale price plus interest and costs. See RAO ET AL., supra note 13, § 14.2, at 359.
73. See Linda Northrup & Karen Luong, Locked Out: In Fighting a Potential Foreclosure,
the Time to Act Is Before the Sale Takes Place, L.A. LAW., Feb. 2008, at 34, 36.
74. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2006) (permitting modification of secured claims "other than a
claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence");
see also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
75. See RAO ET AL., supra note 13, § 9.2.3.1, at 220; supra note 5 and accompanying text.
76. Northrup & Luong, supra note 73, at 34. The only notable exception here is the statutory
right of redemption applicable in a few states. See supra note 72.
77. In other words, the winning bidder is a bona fide purchaser for value. Northrup &
Luong, supra note 73, at 34-35. For example, courts generally will not set aside a sale based on
evidence of defective notice, even if such evidence would have been sufficient to stay foreclosure
presale. Id. A borrower is more likely to be successful in a post-sale challenge if: (1) the
underlying security instrument is invalid; (2) fraud or collusion occur in the bidding process; or
(3) the winning bidder is not a bona fide purchaser, for example if she regularly participates in
foreclosure auctions. Id. at 37-38.
78. See generally RAO ET AL., supra note 13, §§ 2.3.4-.4.5, at 31-35.
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property for less than the outstanding debt.7 9 Similarly, in a deed in
lieu of foreclosure the mortgage holder agrees to discharge mortgage
debt if the borrower voluntarily returns the property." Deed-in-lieu
and short sale avoid a foreclosure notation on the borrower's credit
history.' A repayment or forbearance plan enables a borrower who
has missed payments to avoid foreclosure and retain the mortgaged
property by repaying arrears concurrently with regular monthly
payments.82 The discretion to authorize any of these alternatives rests
with the mortgage holder but is usually delegated to the mortgage
servicer.83
In addition, there is growing interest in another alternative:
mortgage modification. Mortgage modification is a written
agreement to permanently alter one or more loan terms.84 While
modifications can take a variety of forms," they typically involve
some combination of a reduction in interest rate, elongation of the
loan payment term, or reduction in the principal balance.86
Regardless of its form, a mortgage modification seeks to make a loan
affordable to a borrower who, while capable of making substantial
contributions, can no longer afford the mortgage loan terms.
By revising mortgage terms so that monthly payments
correspond to what particular borrowers can afford, modification
directly addresses the underlying problem that led to the foreclosure
crisis-the overextension of risky and unaffordable credit through
subprime and predatory lending." The foreclosure crisis has been
79. See RAO ET AL., supra note 13, § 2.4.3, at 34-35; see also Cox, supra note 8, at 707-08.
80. See RAO ET AL., supra note 13, § 2.4.5, at 35; see also Cox, supra note 8, at 70748.
81. See RAO ET AL., supra note 13, § 2.4.3, at 34; Willis, supra note 8, at 1118 n.34. But see
Cox, supra note 8, at 715 n.201 (stating that the difference between foreclosure versus short sale
or deed-in-lieu on a borrower's credit may not be as significant as many borrowers believe). A
short sale or deed-in-lieu may also enable a borrower to avoid a deficiency judgment. See RAO ET
AL., supra note 13, § 2.3.4.3, at 32.
82. See RAO ET AL., supra note 13, §§ 2.3.4.3-2.3.4.4, at 32; see also Cox, supra note 8, at
707-08.
83. See RAO ET AL., supra note 13, § 2.2.4.3, at 26.
84. Id. § 2.3.4.6, at 33; see also Cox, supra note 8, at 707-08.
85. See RAO ET AL., supra note 13, § 2.3.4.6, at 33.
86. Id. To bring a loan current, a lender might also capitalize arrears and reamortize the loan.
Capitalizing arrears involves adding past due payments to the total remaining loan balance and
reamortization means recalculating monthly payments based on the new loan balance. This type
of modification will make the loan less affordable because monthly payments will increase. Id.;
see also White, supra note 28, at 1114.
87. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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intractable in part because borrowers have had little recourse for
predatory lending, defined in the mortgage context as overpriced or
overly risky loans." By making mortgage debt more closely reflect
current home values and borrower payment capacities, modification
can reduce the foreclosure rate, thereby stabilizing mortgage markets
and the broader economy. 9
Finally, and most significantly, modification is economically
advantageous for mortgage holders and investors under depressed
market conditions because, on average, modification results in a
smaller loss than foreclosure." Recent data indicate that, under
current mortgage market conditions, the average foreclosure entails
more than 50 percent loss in value to investors in securitized
mortgages as opposed to around 5 percent loss for modification.'
Despite the stark contrast between these numbers, state courts have
done little to encourage modification prior to foreclosure
proceedings. The next section explains why.
III. STATE COURTS HAVE BEEN INEFFECTIVE IN MITIGATING THE
FORECLOSURE CRISIS BECAUSE THEY HAVE NOT
ADEQUATELY ENCOURAGED MORTGAGE MODIFICATION
Despite their central role in administering and policing the
foreclosure process, state courts have been ineffective in mitigating
the foreclosure crisis. Part of the problem stems from the courts'
passive facilitation of mechanical foreclosure proceedings. However,
even model foreclosure proceedings can generally only delay, not
avoid, foreclosure. Instead, the central weakness in the state courts'
88. See Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of
Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REv. 707, 711 (2006); supra Part II.C. See generally
Eggert, supra note 22 (explaining how mortgage securitization and the holder in due course
doctrine assigned the risk of fraudulent and predatory lending to borrowers who are more likely to
suffer foreclosure as a result).
89. See David Wessel, Economy Can Strengthen Only When Housing Prices Do, WALL ST.
J., June 25, 2009, at A2.
90. See White, supra note 38, at 521-22.
91. Home Foreclosures: Will Voluntary Mortgage Modification Help Families Save Their
Homes? (Part I): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law, 11Ith
Cong. 13 (2009) (testimony of Alan M. White, Assistant Professor of Law, Valparaiso University
School of Law) (finding that in May and June 2009, foreclosure on Alt-A and subprime
mortgages with an average original loan balance of around $220,000 resulted in an average loss
of $141,953 and $143,987, respectively, compared to $13,077 and $14,353 for modification,
respectively); see also Cox, supra note 8, at 707 n. 142 (discussing 1990 study that found
foreclosure costs mortgage holders an average of $50,000, or 40 percent of loan value); White,
supra note 28, at 1119.
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response has been inadequate encouragement of mortgage
modification. Mortgage modification resolves default and shifts
mortgage debt to make it affordable for borrowers. Mandatory pre-
foreclosure mediation programs, recently established in many states,
have the potential to significantly increase the rate of mortgage
modification. However, state courts have failed to exploit this
potential because they have not taken steps to ensure that mortgage
servicers, who exhibit a foreclosure bias related to their
compensation scheme, behave in accordance with the best interests
of investors who are absent from proceedings.
A. Foreclosure Defense Is Not a Viable
Solution to the Foreclosure Crisis
It is difficult for borrowers in default to defend against
foreclosure. Informational barriers prevent borrowers from
identifying errors that would justify halting the foreclosure process.
Foreclosing parties-generally servicers-routinely file incomplete
or unreviewed legal documents with courts,92 while borrowers and
their advocates often struggle with those same servicers to obtain
loan documents crucial to foreclosure defense.93 Understaffed to
minimize overhead, servicers keep borrowers in call-center limbo for
long periods and are generally uncooperative with borrower requests,
whether informal or formal.94 As the court in one case commented,
"[I]t takes four to six months for [the servicer] to produce a simple
accounting of a loan's history and over four court hearings.""
92. A 2006 study by Katherine Porter found that of 1,733 chapter 13 bankruptcy filings by
mortgage creditors across more than twenty states, 52.8 percent lacked required documentation
(missing note, missing itemization, or missing security interest), yet 96 percent of these claims
passed through the bankruptcy process undisturbed. Katherine M. Porter, Misbehavior and
Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims, 87 TEX. L. REv. 121, 141, 144-46 (2008). This data
raises the inference that state court foreclosure filings suffer similar rates of documentary error.
See id. at 125. As this Article went to press, it was being reported that Bank of America, GMAC
Mortgage, and JPMorgan Chase decided to freeze pending foreclosures in twenty-three states to
correct errors in foreclosure filings that resulted from the practice of "robo-signing," in which a
bank executive would sign thousands of affidavits each month without knowledge of the
information contained in those documents. David Streitfeld, Bank of America to Freeze
Foreclosure Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2010, at B l.
93. See RAO ET AL., supra note 13, § 10.2.2.1, at 259, § 10.2.5, at 261-62, § 10.2.7.1, at 263;
see also Eggert, supra note 26, at 769.
94. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 69, at 1451.
95. In re Jones, 418 B.R. 687, 699 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2009). In this case, Wells Fargo was
enjoined to completely revise its accounting procedures not only with respect to the plaintiff but
for all borrowers it serviced in the court's district because Wells Fargo's preexisting accounting
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In addition to-or perhaps because of-these informational
barriers, between 80 and 90 percent of defaulting borrowers fail to
appear at their hearing dates.96 By failing to appear at the judicial
hearing, the borrower enables the judge to enter default judgment in
favor of the foreclosing party." Of the small portion of borrowers
who appear in court to challenge foreclosure, most proceed without
counsel." Few self-represented borrowers know how to navigate the
legal system and many simply "tell the judge their tales of woe ....
Some of those tales are very sad, but there's nothing the judge can
do."99
Despite the magnitude of the current foreclosure crisis, evidence
of incomplete foreclosure filings, and lack of effective legislative,
regulatory, or market responses, state courts in residential foreclosure
proceedings have mostly adhered to a passive conception of the trial
judge's role. Indeed, "the overwhelming majority of foreclosure
cases before U.S. courts are in essence rubberstamped by the judges
in favor of the mortgage companies."' 0 In some jurisdictions, the
judicial foreclosure process is so abbreviated that borrowers do not
even have the opportunity to relate their tales of woe. For example,
in Florida's "rocket docket," judicial foreclosure proceedings often
last only fifteen seconds."' At these hearings, the judge asks the
practices were systematically riddled with errors. Id. at 698-700; see also Porter, supra note 92,
at 134-36 (discussing frustration of courts in obtaining complete and accurate information from
mortgage servicers).
96. See Mark Fass, Court Taps Community Resources and Creates Foreclosure Program,
N.Y. L.J., June 19, 2008 (quoting Judge Pfau regarding 90-percent default rate in New York);
Seidenberg, supra note 49, at 56 (quoting lender attorney Robert C. Hill Jr. that, "Only about 5 to
10 percent of borrowers show up"); Azam Ahmed, The View From Foreclosure Court, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 20, 2008, at Cl (reporting estimates that 80 percent of Cook County's foreclosure
cases go uncontested).
97. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
98. MELANCA CLARK, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, FORECLOSURES: A CRISIS IN LEGAL
REPRESENTATION 12 (2009). For example, in Stark County, Ohio, 86 percent of borrowers who
appear in foreclosure proceedings do so without any legal representation. Id.
99. Seidenberg, supra note 49, at 56.
100. Jennifer Forsyth, Judges Taking On Foreclosures: Activism or Necessity?, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 24. 2009, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/12/24/judges-taking-on-foreclosures-activism-or-
necessity/.
101. Michael Corkery, A Florida Court's 'Rocket Docket' Blasts Through Foreclosure Cases,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2009, at Al. The "rocket docket" approach stands in stark contrast to the
approach adopted by judges in other jurisdictions emphasizing careful, sua sponte review of
foreclosure filings. See infra notes 202-204 and accompanying text. This variation demonstrates
the broad discretion state courts exercise in determining the manner in which foreclosure cases
are adjudicated.
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borrower whether she is behind on her mortgage and whether she is
currently living on the property; if the borrower answers "yes" to
both questions, the judge immediately authorizes a foreclosure sale
date.' According to one county clerk of courts, administrative
efficiency is the primary purpose behind these rapid-fire
proceedings: "We have to move these cases out of here."0 In
addition, Florida judges who display leniency to borrowers by
delaying foreclosure sales so borrowers have time to find foreclosure
alternatives can expect scolding by higher courts.'"
More searching judicial review and increased access to legal
representation and loan documentation would assist borrowers in
identifying foreclosure defenses and ease their stress in the
foreclosure process. Nevertheless, such improvements would likely
not significantly reduce the foreclosure rate.' With few exceptions,
successful foreclosure defense does not resolve underlying borrower
default.o' In a recent opinion issuing from an Ohio federal court, the
judge dismissed a set of foreclosure actions due to the foreclosing
parties' failure to prove ownership of the underlying mortgages and
promissory notes at the time the foreclosure complaints were filed.'
This case was heralded as a harbinger of tougher judicial review that
would help to reduce the foreclosure rate.' However, as with most
cases where the judge determines a foreclosure claim is flawed or
incomplete, the foreclosure actions were dismissed without
102. Corkery, supra note 101.
103. Id. (quoting Charlie Green, Lee County's clerk of the circuit courts).
104. See Amir Efrati, Foreclosure Challenges Raise Questions About Judicial Role, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 24, 2009, at A15. In September 2009, a Florida state appeals court admonished Judge
Valerie Manno Schurr for routinely delaying foreclosure sales for several months for no reason
other than to enable borrowers to find alternatives to foreclosure. See id.
105. See RAO ET AL., supra note 13, § 4.1, at 75.
106. See id.; see also KRATOVIL, supra note 11, § 474, at 307 (noting how a defect in
foreclosure proceedings "makes a judgment or decree erroneous, but not void").
107. In re Foreclosure Cases, Nos. 1:07CV2282, 07CV2532, 07CV2560, 07CV2602,
07CV2631, 07CV2638, 07CV2681, 07CV2695, 07CV2920, 07CV2930, 07CV2949, 07CV2950,
07CV3000, 07CV3029, 2007 WL 3232430, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2007). This defense has
not gained significant traction in other courts. See Goodyke v. BNC Mortgage, Inc., No. CV 09-
0074-PHX-MHM, 2009 WL 2971086, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 11, 2009); Spencer v. DHI Mortgage
Co., 642 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1166 (E.D. Cal. 2009); see also Robert P. Barnett & Robert S.
Swaine, Re-creating and Correcting Instruments and Agreements, in FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY
LITIGATION § 6.3 (5th ed. 2009) (noting how Florida law is "clear that a person not in possession
of a negotiable instrument may nonetheless enforce it").
108. See Gretchen Morgenson, Foreclosures Hit a Snag for Lenders, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
2007, at Cl.
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prejudice, meaning the foreclosing parties were free to amend and
refile their claims. 09
B. Mortgage Modification Is a Viable
Solution to the Foreclosure Crisis
Unlike foreclosure defense, widespread mortgage modification
has the potential to immediately and directly resolve underlying
borrower default and render mortgage debt affordable over the long
term. Ideally, mass modification would reset unaffordable mortgage
debt originating in subprime and predatory lending. However, state
courts have not sufficiently enforced existing pre-foreclosure
mediation procedures designed to encourage modification and have
thus failed to overcome the foreclosure bias of mortgage servicers.
1. Mortgage Servicers Exhibit a Foreclosure Bias Even When
Modification Is in the Best Interests of Investors
Even when securities investors and borrowers in default would
prefer modification, mortgage servicers gain more financially from
foreclosure. This is one of the primary reasons, if not the central
reason, why voluntary modification has not been more widespread."o
Most PSAs explicitly instruct the mortgage servicer to make
decisions as though the servicer owned the mortgage, functionally
positioning the servicer as a proxy for investors, taken as a whole."
Despite this directive, mortgage servicers are motivated by different
financial interests than investors. Investors receive income from
109. In re Foreclosure Cases, 2007 WL 3232430, at *3. Absent blatant misconduct,
foreclosure defense is unlikely to result in cancellation of mortgage debt. See, e.g., IndyMac Bank
F.S.B v. Yano-Horoski, 890 N.Y.S.2d 313, 315-17, 319 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (canceling alleged
$525,000 mortgage debt because the foreclosing party misled the court about the mortgage debt
owed and engaged in "harsh, repugnant, shocking and repulsive" conduct towards the borrowers).
Foreclosure defense will obviously resolve default if the borrower proves that the default itself is
erroneous. See, e.g., Schlosser v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., 323 F.3d 534, 535-36 (7th Cir. 2003).
In this case, Fairbanks erroneously instituted foreclosure proceedings against a couple who had
brought their delinquent account current. See id.
110. See White, supra note 28, at 1127-29.
111. See DIANE E. THOMPSON, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., WHY SERVICERS FORECLOSE
WHEN THEY SHOULD MODIFY AND OTHER PUZZLES OF SERVICER BEHAVIOR 7 (2009); Gelpem
& Levitin, supra note 24, at 1088-89.
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borrower mortgage paymentsll2 and are thus interested in a
borrower's ability to make those payments without interruption.'"3
In contrast, a servicer's compensation comes from three primary
sources, defined in the PSA.1 4 As a base fee for servicing the loan,
the servicer typically receives twenty-five basis points"'
corresponding to the loan principal."' In most cases, servicers are
compensated at twice this rate to service loans in default."' Servicers
also collect "float income," which is interest earned on payments
prior to disbursement to investors."' Finally, servicers keep any fees
collected, including late payment fees and fees associated with
default." 9 Servicers have been caught posting timely made payments
late, or "losing" payments altogether, in order to charge unnecessary
late fees.'20 Default triggers an additional set of fees, such as property
inspection fees' 2 ' and legal fees,'22 creating additional incentive for
servicers to push borrowers into default and keep them there as long
as possible before foreclosure.'23 These ancillary fees are a major
source of income for servicers. One report indicates that mortgage
servicer Ocwen derives up to 18 percent of its income from ancillary
112. See THOMPSON, supra note 111, at 4; Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 24, at 1092 (noting
that trusts are mere pass-throughs funneling mortgage payment cashflows to investors).
113. See THOMPSON, supra note 111, at 7-8; Tomasz Piskorski et al., Securitization and
Distressed Loan Renegotiation: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis 31 (Chi. Booth
Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 09-02, 2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1321646
(noting that investor profitability depends on continuing mortgage payments).
114. See White, supra note 28, at 1127.
115. One basis point is equal to 0.01 percent of a total quantity. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 102 (11th ed. 2003).
116. Seidenberg, supra note 49, at 58.
117. THOMPSON, supra note 111, at 19 (noting that mortgage servicer fees are calculated on
an annual basis); Seidenberg, supra note 49, at 58. Thus, while the fee for servicing a performing
loan with a $250,000 balance would be $625, the fee increases to $1,250 upon borrower default.
See id. Servicing fees for subprime loans are also generally higher than for Alt-A and fixed-rate
prime loans. See id.
118. THOMPSON, supra note 111, at 19; see also White, supra note 28, at 1127.
119. THOMPSON, supra note 111, at 17.
120. See Eggert, supra note 26, at 758-59.
121. THOMPSON, supra note 11, at 17.
122. Eggert, supra note 26, at 757.
123. THOMPSON, supra note 111, at 17; Kurt Eggert, Comment on Michael A. Stegman et
al. 's "Preventive Servicing Is Good for Business and Affordable Homeownership Policy": What
Prevents Loan Modifications?, 18 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 279, 287 (2007); see also Eggert,
supra note 26, at 772-73 (discussing how servicer-fee abuse may be the cause of foreclosure in
many cases); Porter, supra note 92, at 132.
1404
Summer 2010] PROTECTING ABSENT STAKEHOLDERS
fees,124 while another study found that ancillary fees covered a
servicer's entire operating expenses, leaving the basic servicing fee
as almost pure profit.'25
Foreclosure also generates immediate income for servicers.
When a borrower enters default, the servicer must front legal fees
and borrower payments to investors.126 With a foreclosure sale, the
servicer recoups these cash outlays immediately.27 In contrast, if the
servicer modifies a loan, investors receive the benefit of continued
monthly payments while the servicer may receive no extra fees in the
short term.'28
Another reason that servicers may be resistant to modification is
fear of investor lawsuits. Because investors own tranches that
represent different revenue streams, there is concern that
modification will be detrimental to some investors even while
benefiting others. For example, a modification that reduces the
interest rate but does not reduce the principal will benefit investors
who own principal payment tranches and harm investors who own
interest payment tranches. Some have argued that these internal
investor frictions have deterred servicers from modifying for fear
that adversely affected investors would consequently sue the
servicers.129
Servicers' anxiety over exposure to investor litigation has been
undercut by several developments. First, servicers are effectively
protected by recently enacted federal safe harbor provisions, which
immunize servicers against investor litigation so long as
modifications are performed in conformity with standard industry
practices.' In 2007, the American Securitization Forum established
124. THOMPSON, supra note I11, at 17.
125. Eggert, supra note 26, at 758.
126. See THOMPSON, supra note 111, at 19; Eggert, supra note 26, at 755; White, supra note
28, at 1127-28.
127. See White, supra note 28, at 1127-28.
128. See id. Modification typically incorporates servicer advances into the loan balance, often
deferred in a balloon payment due at the end of the loan term many years later. See id. at 1114;
Piskorski et al., supra note 113, at 1 n.5.
129. See Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 24, at 1091-93; Manuel Adelino et al., Why Don't
Lenders Renegotiate More Home Mortgages?: Redefaults, Self-Cures, and Securitization 4 (Fed.
Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper No. 2009-17, 2009).
130. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639a (2006); THOMPSON, supra note 111, at 8 & 42 n.50 ("This
provision rewrote an earlier servicer safe harbor provision contained in the HOPE for
Homeowners Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, div. A, tit. IV, § 1403 (July 30, 2008).").
1405
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW
standard industry practice for modification when the Forum issued
general guidelines directing servicers to act in the best interests of
investors in the aggregate, regardless of adverse consequences to
particular classes of investors."' Furthermore, as a practical matter,
there simply has not been any litigation between investors and
servicersl32  and most PSAs impose only minor limits on
modification.13
In light of recent data demonstrating tenfold-higher losses from
foreclosure compared to modification, 3 4 servicer bias in favor of
foreclosure is economically wasteful."' Even when "investor losses
may be very large, . . . the servicer will almost always benefit by
completing a foreclosure sale.""'
2. Mortgage Mediation Programs Provide Necessary But
Insufficient Infrastructure to Overcome Servicer Foreclosure Bias
To address the conflict between foreclosure interests and
modification interests, courts and legislatures in at least fourteen
states have implemented mandatory pre-foreclosure mediation
programs ("mediation programs") to encourage voluntary
modification or other workout agreements."' Under some of these
131. ANDREW JAKABOVICS & ALON COHEN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, IT'S TIME WE
TALKED 29 (2009), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/06/pdf/foreclosuremediation.
pdf. For more information on the 2007 guidelines, see AM. SECURITIZATION FORUM,
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND GUIDELINES FOR THE MODIFICATION OF
SECURITIZED SUBPRIME RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LOANS (2007), http://www.american
securitization.com/uploadedFiles/ASF%20Subprime%2Loan%20Modification%20Principles_0
60107.pdf.
132. See Adelino et al., supra note 129, at 4 (noting that "of the more than 800 lawsuits filed
by investors in subprime mortgages through the end of 2008, not one involved the right of a
servicer to modify a loan").
133. See John P. Hunt, What Do Subprime Securitization Contracts Actually Say About Loan
Modification?: Preliminary Results and Implications 6 (Mar. 25, 2009) (Working Paper,
Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the Economy), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfn?abstractid=1369286 (reporting that the PSAs of 90 percent of subprime loan volume
surveyed generally permitted modifications).
134. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text (reporting study results showing that
modification results in 5 percent loss for investors but foreclosure entails a 50 percent loss, on
average).
135. See id.; Piskorski et al., supra note 113, at 31.
136. White, supra note 28, at 1128.
137. GEOFFRY WALSH, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE
MEDIATION PROGRAMS: CAN THEY SAVE HOMES? 1, 4-5 (2009). Maryland recently
implemented a foreclosure mediation program that requires the foreclosing party to submit a loss-
mitigation report with thirty days prior to a foreclosure sale. See Ovetta Wiggins, Maryland Bill
Provides Foreclosure Mediation for Homeowners, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2010,
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programs, a mortgage servicer cannot foreclose without good-faith
participation in mediation.'" Most mediation programs require a
servicer to designate a representative who has the power to authorize
modification or other pre-foreclosure alternatives in negotiations
with the borrower.139 Mediation helps achieve mortgage modification
by bringing relevant parties to the bargaining table and creating the
opportunity for amicable resolution to borrower default. 14 0 But
without a rigorous enforcement scheme to ensure that servicers
participate in good faith, these programs are fatally pro forma and
thus insufficient to fulfill their potential.
Because mediation programs have only recently been
implemented, there is currently little data available to empirically
evaluate their efficacy.14' Early reports contain mixed results and are
difficult to interpret due to their lack of specific information about
case outcomes. In Connecticut, about 4,000 cases were mediated
between July 2008 and August 2009, with 62 percent of participants
keeping their homes and 13 percent arranging "graceful exits"l 42
through short sales or deeds in lieu of foreclosure.143 It is not clear
what percentage of participating borrowers who kept their homes
received modifications.144  Philadelphia's Mortgage Foreclosure
Diversion Pilot Program, considered one of the best mediation
programs, has resulted in 2,776 out of 4,690 participants avoiding
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/14/AR2010041404602.html. As
of this writing, it is too early to evaluate the efficacy of this program, although it has received
criticism for its timetable. See ANDREW JAKABOVICS & ALON COHEN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS,
Now WE'RE TALKING 13-14 (2010), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/06/pdf/
foreclosuremediation.pdf.
138. See WALSH, supra note 137, at 17 (noting that, as of September 2009, Maine and
Nevada were the only states with mediation programs that include a good-faith requirement).
Foreclosure mediation programs take several forms. Some programs refer parties to the court's
pre-existing alternative dispute resolution system. Some involve court-supervised settlement
conferences between the parties. Others simply direct mortgage servicers to communicate with
defaulting borrowers to discuss pre-foreclosure settlement alternatives. See id. at 4-5. For the
sake of brevity, this Article uses the term "mediation program" to refer to all of these program
formats.
139. Id. at 12.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 1.
142. See Bob Tedeschi, Another Foreclosure Alternative, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2010, at RE7.
143. Douglas S. Malan, Spreading the Word: State Works to Draw More Homeowners into
Mediation Program, CONN. L. TRIB., Oct. 26, 2009, at 1.
144. See id
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foreclosure between June 2008 and May 2009.145 It is unclear how
many of these borrowers received modifications or what form those
modifications took.14 6
In most states or cities, if the state or city has a program at all,
the outcomes probably look more like those in New Jersey. There,
about 2,600 troubled borrowers have requested mediationl47 since the
program went into effect in January 2009.148 Of these borrowers, only
750 have received modifications, many of them temporary.149 In
contrast, 63,208 New Jersey properties received foreclosure filings
during roughly the same period.'o So far, there is little evidence that
these programs are producing substantial and affordable long-term
modifications."'
Anecdotal evidence suggests that mediation programs have been
ineffective because servicers have been allowed to satisfy court
requirements through minimal participation and continue to move
cases to foreclosure.'52 In many cases, servicers provide take-it-or-
leave-it offers without the documentation that would allow borrowers
or courts to objectively evaluate the reasonableness of offers.' 3
While some courts apply "stricter standards for appearances,
production of documents, and good faith participation," many "freely
tolerate[] token participation."'54 As a consequence, "[s]ervicers
effectively control the terms of discussion in most programs."'5 5
145. Jon Hurdle, Program Saves 60 Percent of Homes from Foreclosure, REUTERS, June 30,
2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE55T74A20090630.
146. See id.
147. Editorial, Help for Homeowners: Banks Should Be More Willing to Chip In, N.J. STAR-
LEDGER, Feb. 18, 2010, at 16.
148. Bob Tedeschi, State Programs Help Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2009, at RE6.
149. Editorial, supra note 147. This report does not indicate how many modifications are
temporary. See id.; see also Henry Gottlieb, N.J Foreclosure Mediation Program Found
Hampered by Low Participation, 197 N.J. L.J. 1029 (2009) (presenting earlier figures and noting
that the program has been hampered by a low rate of borrower participation, as only 5 percent of
borrowers seek help).
150. Press Release, RealtyTrac, RealtyTrac Year-End Report Shows Record 2.8 Million U.S.
Properties with Foreclosure Filings in 2009 (Jan. 14, 2010), http://rismedia.com/2010-01-
14/realtytrac-year-end-report-shows-record-2-8-million-u-s-properties-with-foreclosure-filings-
in-2009. RealtyTrac data reflects the number of properties that received foreclosure filings during
2009, not completed foreclosures. Id.
151. See WALSH, supra note 137, at v.
152. See id. at 12.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 13.
155. Id.
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Without external oversight, servicers will continue to act to
maximize their financial gain, skimping on mediation and pushing
for foreclosure.
IV. STATE COURTS SHOULD PREVENT MORTGAGE SERVICERS FROM
PURSUING FORECLOSURE WHEN MODIFICATION IS IN THE
BEST INTERESTS OF INVESTORS ABSENT FROM LITIGATION
The economic and social consequences of litigation are rarely
limited to the litigants. The costs or benefits of a particular judgment
may flow to the litigant's family, community, or business relations."'
In most cases, the connection between litigation and collateral
consequences is too attenuated to merit legal consideration. When,
however, court proceedings are poised to directly affect absent
parties whose interests are not aligned with those of active litigants,
courts have repeatedly and consistently assumed an equitable duty to
protect the absent parties' interests.' This duty is amplified when
important public policy considerations are at stake-when, in
essence, the public at large is an absent stakeholder to the litigation:
"[t]he interests of absentees ... become more pressing as social and
economic activity is increasingly organized through large aggregates
of people."' In such cases, courts justifiably employ discretionary
power to craft or withhold relief that would otherwise be left to
individual litigants. In doing so, courts exercise what may be termed
their parens absentis power-their reserved authority to guard the
interests of absent stakeholders.
Judicial protection of absent stakeholders is a recurring theme in
the law, though its sporadic appearance in different contexts has
inhibited development of a coherent doctrinal approach. This section
reviews a selection of these scattered areas in an effort to trace a
principled approach to the absent stakeholder problem. The
subsequent section explains that the current foreclosure crisis
presents a novel but needed application of the absent stakeholder
doctrine.
156. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., American Law Institute Study on Paths to a "Better Way":
Litigation, Alternatives, and Accommodation: Background Paper, 1989 DuKE L.J. 824, 868-73
(1989); supra note 10 and accompanying text.
157. See infra Part V.A.
158. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281,
1294 (1976).
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A. Identifying the Judicial Duty to Protect Absent Stakeholders
Before crafting a principled approach on the absent stakeholder
problem, it is important to recognize that judicial intervention on
behalf of absent stakeholders presents a valid concern about eroding
the appearance of judicial impartiality. For this reason, courts and
legislatures have developed applications of the absent stakeholder
doctrine that are only as broad as necessary to protect absent
stakeholder interests.
1. The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act
One of the simplest and narrowest applications of this doctrine is
codified by the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA).'" Under
50 U.S.C. app. § 521(b)(2), when it appears that a defendant named
in a civil action is an active member of the military, the court has a
duty to appoint an attorney to represent the absent defendant's
interests.' Notably, the SCRA protects servicemembers on active
duty from foreclosure.' The policy behind this rule is clear:
volunteering to defend the national interest through military service
should not render a citizen defenseless to adverse default judgment in
civil court.162
2. Ex Parte Judicial Proceedings
Another example of the judicial duty to protect absent
stakeholders appears in the context of ex parte judicial proceedings.
Commenting on the duty of candor, the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (MRPC) explain, in pertinent part, that "[t]he object of an
ex parte proceeding is . . . to yield a substantially just result. The
judge has an affirmative responsibility to accord the absent party just
consideration."' Commonly arising in the context of requests for
temporary restraining orders, the duty of candor in ex parte
proceedings obligates an attorney appearing before the court to
159. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 501-96 (2006).
160. This statute provides, in relevant part, that "[i]f in an action covered by this section it
appears that the defendant is in military service, the court may not enter a judgment until after the
court appoints an attorney to represent the defendant." Id. § 521 (b)(2).
161. See RAO ET AL., supra note 13, § 4.9.1-3, at 99-100.
162. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, SCRA. Servicemembers' Civil Relief Act,
http://www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcycourts/bankruptcybasics/scra.html (last visited June 4, 2010).
163. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 14 (2007).
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disclose material facts favorable to the absent party.'" However, as
the text of the MRPC commentary clearly provides, the duty of
candor includes a corollary judicial duty to weigh the interests of
absent stakeholders in deciding whether to extend injunctive relief.'5
This duty is both mandatory and narrow: the judge in ex parte
proceedings does not assume an advocacy position in favor of the
absent party, but only counterpoises a representational imbalance
prior to authorizing a remedy.
3. Child Welfare and Financial Interests
The absent stakeholder doctrine takes on a more paternalistic
form in the parens patriae power the court assumes in relation to
child welfare and mental incapacitation. Parens patriae translates to
"parent of his or her country" and is a doctrine under which the state
must protect those unable to care for themselves.'66 Despite the
fundamental constitutional right of parents to choose how to rear
children,' courts may exercise their inherent parens patriae
authority to intervene in the "private realm of family life" to protect
children from harm.'68 For example, courts have ordered medically
necessary blood transfusions against parents' wishes.'69 In a child
custody dispute, the court's overriding duty is to protect the best
interests of the child even though the nominal litigants are parents or
guardians seeking custody.7
Courts also recognize a duty to protect the interests of infants
and unborn beneficiaries in settlement agreements involving trust
funds."' Thus, courts have the power "not to approve [a settlement]
164. See id. R. 3.3(d) (2007) ("In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of
all material facts known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision,
whether or not the facts are adverse.").
165. See id. R. 3.3 cmt. 14 (2007).
166. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 12, at 1221. See generally Fawzy v. Fawzy, 973
A.2d 347, 358 n.3 (N.J. 2009) (discussing historical roots of the parens patriae doctrine).
167. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-33 (1972).
168. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944). ("[T]he family itself is not
beyond regulation in the public interest, as against a claim of religious liberty.").
169. E.g., Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 320 A.2d 518, 521 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1974); see also Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp. Unit No. I (Harborview), 278 F.
Supp. 488, 498-99, 504-05 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (per curiam).
170. See, e.g., Roberts v. Ward, 493 A.2d 478, 481-82 (N.H. 1985) (explaining that the court,
as an instrumentality of the state, may use its parens patriae power to determine child custody
using the best interests of the child as the "beacon by which to guide all custody matters").
171. See Hunter v. Newsom, 468 S.E.2d 802, 805 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
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where it is made to appear to the court that the rights and interests of
minor or unborn beneficiaries are not protected."1 7 2 Courts have thus
shown a willingness to apply the absent stakeholder doctrine to
protect the purely economic interests of absent minor or unborn trust
beneficiaries in addition to the physical and developmental interests
of nonparty children.
4. Class Action Settlement
Courts most frequently exercise the absent stakeholder doctrine
in the context of class action settlement. Class actions are proper
where the aggregated claims are legally or factually similar, the
claims are sufficiently numerous that individual adjudication or
adjudication through joinder would impose excessive administrative
burdens on the court, and the class has adequate legal
representation.' A class representative is chosen to participate in
court proceedings on behalf of the class alongside class counsel. 17 4
Courts perform an oversight role to address a major problem in class
action cases: in settling class action claims, there may be an internal
class conflict or a conflict between the class and its attorney.
Internal class conflicts occur when subclasses within the pool of
plaintiffs have different interests in the settlement terms."' In
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, a landmark asbestos class action,
the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a settlement due to a conflict
between plaintiffs already manifesting injuries, who preferred
immediate payouts, and plaintiffs with latent or potential injuries,
who preferred preserving funds for future payout.'7 6 Attorney-class
conflicts can also occur in class action settlements. For example, in
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.," another asbestos case, the full payment
for previously settled claims was contingent on resolution of an
insurance coverage dispute or a global settlement of claims, creating
172. Id.
173. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). The four prerequisites to class certification are numerosity,
typicality, commonality, and adequacy of representation. Id. In addition, a class action must fall
into one of three enumerated categories. Id. R. 23(b).
174. See FED. R. Cv. P. 23.
175. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
176. Id. at 625-29. The court stated that "for the currently injured, the critical goal is
generous immediate payments. That goal tugs against the interest of exposure-only plaintiffs in
ensuring an ample, inflation-protected fund for the future." Id. at 626.
177. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
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an incentive for plaintiffs counsel to reach a settlement for future
claims at a discount in order to secure fees from the prior
settlements. "
To avoid conflicts of interest, the presiding judge must review
any settlement for fairness and reasonableness before authorizing it
to proceed."' Courts have articulated this approval power in terms of
a fiduciary duty-a duty to act in another's best interests's 0-- owed to
absent class members: "The court has a fiduciary responsibility as
guardian of the rights of the absentee class members when deciding
whether to approve a settlement agreement.""' Further, the purpose
of requiring court approval of class action settlement is "to protect
the interests of non-party class members. In determining whether a
settlement adversely affects such interests, the essential question is
whether the proposed settlement is fair and reasonable and in the best
interests of all those who will be [a]ffected by it."' 82 Thus, in the
class action context, the court assumes an explicit role in shaping the
outcome of litigation by considering absent stakeholders.
5. Shareholder Derivative Lawsuits
A variation on the court's duty to protect absent stakeholders
appears in the context of settlement of stockholder derivative
lawsuits.' The plaintiff in a derivative lawsuit is a stockholder who
sues on behalf of the corporation to prevent or remedy a wrong
178. Id. at 822-26, 852-53.
179. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
180. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 12, at 581.
181. In re Cellphone Termination Fee Cases, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 275, 281 (Ct. App. 2009)
(quoting Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 20 (Ct. App. 2008)) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (alteration omitted); see also In re N.M. Indirect Purchasers Microsoft
Corp., 2007-NMCA-007, 1 12, 140 N.M. 879, 149 P.3d 976 ("[Tlhe judiciary has a duty ... [to
act] as a fiduciary for class members . . . ."); Platte v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 2008-NMSC-
058, 1 7, 145 N.M. 77, 194 P.3d 108 ("In a class action settlement, the district court is the
protector of the unnamed class members' rights and acts on the level of a fiduciary.").
182. Ingram v. Madison Square Garden Ctr., Inc., 482 F. Supp. 426, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(citations omitted).
183. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(c) ("A derivative action may be settled, voluntarily dismissed,
or compromised only with the court's approval."). Such suits empower stockholders to vindicate
the corporation's rights when it appears likely that corporate executives will not act to redress a
harm (for example if corporate executives are themselves responsible for the harm). See Seth
Aronson et al., Shareholder Derivative Actions: From Cradle to Grave, in SECURITIES
LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2009, at 167-68 (PLI Corporate Law and Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 1762, 2009).
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perpetrated against the corporation.'84 In such cases, courts recognize
a duty "to protect the best interests of the corporation and its absent
shareholders all of whom will be barred from future litigation on
these claims if the settlement is approved."8 ' Again, the purpose
behind judicial oversight is to prevent named parties from reaching a
self-interested settlement at the expense of the rights of absentees:
"The reason for the [judicial approval] requirement is obvious.
Because the rights of many persons are at stake who are parties to the
action only through their representative, a settlement negotiated
between the named parties may not give due regard to the interests of
those unnamed." 86
6. Crafting an Approach to the Absent Stakeholder
In reflecting upon legal applications of the absent stakeholder
doctrine, several principal features become apparent. First, there
must be an absent stakeholder-a party, beneficiary, or third person
not directly represented in the proceedings whose interests or legal
rights will be directly affected by the outcome of litigation. Second,
courts find it appropriate to assume a protective role when there is
reason to distrust an available party's willingness or ability to
adequately represent the interests of an absent stakeholder. Third, in
discharging their protective duty, courts deploy remedial procedures
narrowly tailored to protect absent stakeholders' interests. In most
cases, it is sufficient for courts to reserve the authority to reject
proposed settlements or requested relief. With the exception of child
custody cases, courts rarely go so far as to shape the form of relief
itself. Given these considerations, conditions are ripe for extending
the absent stakeholder doctrine to the foreclosure litigation context.
184. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 549-50 (1949).
185. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 966-67 (Del. Ch. 1996).
186. Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1970). The fact that unnamed or absent
shareholders fail to directly intervene in the litigation tends to enhance rather than diminish the
intensity of the court's oversight function: "In compromises of class actions, such as minority
stockholders' suits, the District Court [acts as] . . . guardian of absent parties and of the
corporation as a whole. The silence or the absence of shareholders does not relieve the judge of
his duty. Indeed it may charge him with an added responsibility . . . ." Heddendorf v. Goldfine,
167 F. Supp. 915, 926 (D. Mass. 1958) (citations and emphasis omitted).
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B. State Court Judges Should Recognize a Duty to Protect the
Interests ofAbsent Stakeholders in Foreclosure Litigation
In the foreclosure litigation context, the first step is to identify
the absent stakeholder. Given the structure of mortgage markets,
foreclosure litigation creates a synecdoche of communities; each
party stands in for the interests of a larger group. The defaulting
borrower indirectly represents the residential neighborhood in which
the borrower's home is situated.' The mortgage servicer more
literally stands in for the trustee and investors in mortgage-backed
securities.'" These represented "communities" are absent from
foreclosure litigation and both groups are affected by foreclosure.
While the substantial secondary harms of foreclosure on
residential communities and municipalities have been well-
documented,'89 there is a stronger basis for extending judicial
protection to absent investors. First, unlike residential communities,
investors have an immediate financial stake in the litigation itself."
Second, unlike the relationship between borrowers and residential
communities, there is a misalignment of incentives between
mortgage servicers and investors regarding the outcome of
foreclosure litigation. While borrowers and communities generally
share a preference for avoiding foreclosure, mortgage servicers often
favor foreclosure even when investors would financially benefit from
loan modification. 9 ' There is thus a concern that mortgage servicers
are inadequately representing investor interests, a misalignment that
calls for judicial oversight of the servicer's behavior in litigation.'9 2
187. Foreclosure lowers surrounding home values and decreases the municipal tax base,
among other ills. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Foreclosure also reduces the value of
mortgage-backed investments when a foreclosure sale nets lower value than would accrue to
investors from an affordable loan modification. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 27 and 111 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., Immergluck & Smith, supra note 10; Willis, supra note 8.
190. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
191. See supra Part III.B.l.
192. Christopher Mayer, Edward Morrison, and Tomasz Piskorski present an alternative
solution to the problem of servicer foreclosure bias, focusing on increasing monetary incentives
to modify. See Christopher Mayer et al., A New Proposal for Loan Modifications, 26 YALE J. ON
REG. 417, 419-20 (2009).
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1. State Courts Should Extend the Absent Stakeholder
Doctrine to the Foreclosure Litigation Context
Despite owning a stake in the outcome of foreclosure litigation,
investors are usually absent from the legal proceedings and exercise
almost no control over the decision of whether to modify or foreclose
upon a particular mortgage. Servicers are employed precisely
because remote and dispersed groups of investors are not in a
practical position to manage mortgages.'9 3 Further, as set forth above,
mortgage servicers' financial incentives in relation to foreclosure are
different than those of investors.19 4 Servicers do not own direct
financial interests in the mortgages, only contracts to collect late fees
and servicing charges.' In most cases, servicers prefer foreclosure to
collect immediate returns over modifications that would secure long-
term gains for investors. As in other contexts in which courts have
employed the absent stakeholder doctrine, foreclosure litigation
involves a reason to distrust the representational adequacy of
mortgage servicers on behalf of absent investors.
Foreclosure litigation involving securitized mortgages presents a
functional scenario substantially similar to class action settlement
negotiations. Both foreclosure mediation and class action settlement
aim to dispose of cases in lieu of litigation.'96 Both involve decision-
making by parties purporting to represent the interests of numerous
stakeholders absent from court proceedings.'97 Most importantly,
both involve perverse incentives for plaintiffs to choose sub-optimal
outcomes for absent stakeholders in pursuit of narrow self-interest.
Settling class action plaintiffs have an incentive to collude with
defense counsel to secure larger fees at the expense of class
interests.' Similarly, mortgage servicers have an incentive to
foreclose property in pursuit of immediate income irrespective of the
financial benefits that would accrue to investors through
modification.' Without a procedural mechanism to police decision
193. See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
194. See supra Part II.B.1.
195. Servicers sometimes own a residual interest in the trust as a whole, but this interest
represents excess payments and is not a significant source of income. See THOMPSON, supra note
111, at 20--21.
196. See supra notes 137-140, 173-182 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 26-31, 173-182 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 173-182 and accompanying text.
199. See Willis, supra note 8, at 1217-22; supra notes 126-128 and accompanying text.
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making in foreclosure litigation, servicers will continue to exhibit a
foreclosure bias to extract profits at the expense of absent investors'
interests.
2. Extending the Absent Stakeholder Doctrine to
Foreclosure Litigation Presents Manageable Challenges
The comparison between class action settlement and foreclosure
litigation reveals an important distinction. While the danger to absent
class members is that attorneys have an interest in pushing
inadequate settlements, the danger in foreclosure litigation is that
mortgage servicers will improperly eschew settlement. This has an
important consequence for the judge's role in each case. In the class
action context, the judge reserves the power to block the parties' exit
from litigation; in the foreclosure litigation context, the judge would
need to block a mortgage servicer's access to litigation.
However, this distinction is not critical. To the extent that courts
take seriously the protection of absent stakeholder interests, it does
not matter whether courts are closing procedural doors or refusing to
open them. Courts cannot predict the "multifarious means which
human ingenuity can devise . . . to gain an advantage over another"200
and should not excuse deleterious conduct simply because it takes a
novel form or would require new procedures to curtail.
Further, judges already enjoy broad discretion in adjudicating
foreclosure cases. As discussed above, some courts employ a
passive, mechanical approach to foreclosure actions.20 ' However, it is
important to note that state court judges are not legally bound to this
mechanical style. For example, Judge Arthur M. Schack, a self-
proclaimed "little guy in Brooklyn," rejected nearly 50 percent of the
foreclosure motions he reviewed over a recent two-year period.2 02
Performing his own research on property record databases in search
of legal errors and improprieties, Judge Schack's judicial approach is
straightforward: "If you are going to take away someone's house,
everything should be legal and correct . . . . I'm a strange guy-I
200. Stapleton v. Holt, 250 P.2d 451, 453-54 (Okla. 1952).
201. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
202. Michael Powell, A 'Little Judge' Who Rejects Foreclosures, Brooklyn Style, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 31, 2009, at Al. Judge Schack rejected 46 out of 102 foreclosures over a two-year period.
Id.
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don't want to put a family on the street unless it's legitimate."2 03
Judge Schack dismisses cases after searching for and identifying
flaws in foreclosure actions sua sponte, even when the borrower fails
to respond to foreclosure filings.204 The contrast between Florida's
"rocket docket" and Judge Schack's conscientious approach
demonstrates that there is no barrier in principle to judges applying
the absent stakeholder doctrine to foreclosure litigation. Nor are there
significant practical barriers, as mediation programs are already
funded and in operation.20 5 The only remaining barrier is volitional.2 06
In sum, foreclosure litigation involving securitized mortgages
presents conditions ripe for judicial intervention under the aegis of
the absent stakeholder doctrine because the primary stakeholders in
foreclosure proceedings-investors-are neither present in the court
nor adequately represented by mortgage servicers. Even if
modification would plainly benefit investors, servicers are presently
unrestrained from pursuing foreclosure. Given that the role of
servicers within the securitization scheme is to manage mortgages on
behalf of investors, this lack of regulation of servicer conduct despite
evidence of abuse gives rise to a judicial duty to protect investors'
interests in their absence. Further, discharging this duty need not
entail excessive burden on or complication for the courts. Instead,
implementing this proposal would likely ease docket congestion, as a
substantial number of foreclosure cases would be impeded from
proceeding through the foreclosure process.
3. Judges Can Narrowly and Effectively Protect Absent
Stakeholders Using an Established, Objective Analytical Tool:
The Net Present Value Calculation
The previous subsection sought to provide a basic theoretical
justification for rigorously policing the foreclosure mediation
process, a justification based on the neglected interests of absent
stakeholders. This subsection proposes that state courts can narrowly
and effectively discharge this duty to protect absent investors by
203. Id.
204. See id.
205. See supra Part III.B.2.
206. It is possible that implementing this doctrine in a consistent manner may require
statutory intervention by state legislatures to mandate judicial oversight of the mediation process.
However, passing such legislation would likely be much more feasible if particular courts first
demonstrate that this approach produces successful results.
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utilizing an existing analytical method: Net Present Value (NPV), the
current value of a cash-generating investment.207 To give foreclosure
mediation programs sufficient teeth, judges should require servicers
to provide a written evaluation and offer sheet presenting an NPV
calculation and reasonable workout alternatives for the borrower (or
explaining why no such alternatives exist). This will require that the
borrower reveal current income information and that the servicer
disclose relevant loan documentation, including loan origination
documents, complete loan payment history, PSA, and property
appraisal. These disclosures will enable the court to determine
whether the servicer's and borrower's claims in mediation are in
good faith. Most importantly, judges should make advancement of
cases to foreclosure contingent on the outcome of NPV analysis and
satisfaction of disclosure requirements. If the NPV of a modification
would exceed the NPV of foreclosure, the servicer should not be
permitted to foreclose.
One method of calculating NPV,208 currently in use by the
federal government's Home Affordable Modification Program
(HAMP), involves a two-step approach to determine whether it is in
the best interests of investors for a mortgage servicer to modify or
foreclose on a particular mortgage.209 The first step, dubbed the
"standard waterfall," involves arriving at modified loan terms that a
207. See Investopedia, Net Present Value, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/npv.asp (last
visited June 4, 2010) (defining NPV as "[t]he difference between the present value of cash
inflows and the present value of cash outflows" and explaining that "NPV is used in capital
budgeting to analyze the profitability of an investment or project").
208. The HAMP model is not the only possible NPV model available to the courts. Another
model, currently in use in Maine's mediation program, is issued by the FDIC (known as the "mod
in a box"). See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6321-A (2009); FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC
LOAN MODIFICATION PROGRAM (2008), available at http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/loans/
loanmod/FDICLoanMod.pdf, Maine Foreclosure Diversion Program, Attorney Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.courts.state.me.us/courtjinfo/fdp/attny-faq.html (last visited June 4,
2010).
209. See MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE, HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM BASE
NET PRESENT VALUE (NPV) MODEL SPECIFICATIONS, https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/docs/
hamp-servicer/npvoverview.pdf (last visited June 4, 2010) [hereinafter HAMP SPECIFICATIONS].
The HAMP program claims that "[w]hen mortgage modifications have a positive NPV, it is in the
best interests of lenders, servicers, investors, and borrowers to modify mortgages to reduce the
risk of foreclosure." Id. However, this Article questions the proposition that positive NPV
necessarily implies that modification is in the best interests of servicers. See supra Part III.B. 1.
The securitization industry itself favors the use of NPV analysis to determine the best interests of
investors. See WALSH, supra note 137, at 8 & 38 n.25.
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defaulting borrower can afford given her current gross income.2"o To
arrive at this figure, the model calculates what a borrower can afford
based on a 31 percent front-end debt-to-income ratio (DTI),2 11 which
simply means the percentage of gross monthly income devoted to
housing expenses.2 12 For example, a person with a $3,225 monthly
income can afford to spend roughly $1,000 per month on housing at
a 31 percent DTI.21 3 Next, the loan is recalibrated by incrementally
lowering the interest rate, to as low as 2 percent, until monthly
payments on the loan reach the 31 percent DTI figure.2 14 If at an
interest rate of 2 percent the monthly payment still exceeds the 31
percent DTI, the length of the loan is incrementally increased up to
forty years to further lower the monthly payment.2 15
After the standard waterfall produces modified loan terms a
borrower can afford, the next step involves calculating the NPV of
the affordable modified loan ("modified value") and comparing it to
the likely net recovery from selling the mortgaged property through
foreclosure ("foreclosure value").216 It is a basic economic principle
that cash in hand today is worth more than a promise of future
payment.217 While foreclosure generates immediate income, NPV
analysis discounts the value of a modified loan to present value,
facilitating a simple comparison between modified value-which is
210. See HAMP SPECIFICATIONS, supra note 209, at 2; FANNIE MAE, HOME AFFORDABLE
MODIFICATION PROGRAM: BASE NET PRESENT VALUE (NVP) MODEL v3.0 MODEL
DOCUMENTATION 34-35, https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/docs/hamp-servicer/npvmodel
documentationv3.pdf (last visited June 4, 2010) [hereinafter HAMP MODEL DOCUMENTATION].
211. HAMP SPECIFICATIONS, supra note 209, at 2.
212. Front-end DTI is the percentage of income devoted to housing, while back-end DTI is
the percentage of income devoted to all outstanding debt. Ronald Law, Note, Preventing
Predatory Lending in the California Subprime Mortgage Market, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 529, 542
n. 101 (2009). This Article uses "DTI" to refer to front-end DTI.
213. See HAMP SPECIFICATIONS, supra note 209. The monthly payment calculation takes
into account loan principal, interest, property taxes, and insurance. WALSH, supra note 137, at 8.
214. Fannie Mae, Home Affordable Modification Program Overview, https://www.hmp
admin.com/portal/programs/hamp.html (last visited June 4, 2010) [hereinafter HAMP Overview];
HAMP MODEL DOCUMENTATION, supra note 210, at 35.
215. HAMP Overview, supra note 214; HAMP MODEL DOCUMENTATION, supra note 210, at
35. If the terms of the loan remain unaffordable even at 2 percent over a forty year term, HAMP
guidelines then provide for forbearance of principal to further reduce monthly payments. HAMP
Overview, supra note 214; HAMP MODEL DOCUMENTATION, supra note 210, at 35. This Article
omits discussion of the forbearance component for the sake of simplicity.
216. See HAMP SPECIFICATIONS, supra note 209, at 2-3.
217. See id. at 4. For example, a $1,050 payment one year from now is worth $1,000 today
assuming a 5 percent interest rate. Cash in hand today may also be more valuable than future
payment to an entity facing immediate financial distress. See infra text accompanying note 246.
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based on future payment-and foreclosure value.2 18 The NPV
calculation also takes into account other factors, including the
likelihood of redefault after modification, the likelihood of cure
without modification, the likelihood of borrower prepayment, and
financial incentives to modify provided by the government.219
Additionally, the foreclosure-value calculation takes into account
expenses incurred in foreclosing and reselling property, including
legal expenses, lost interest over the period between default and
foreclosure, property maintenance costs, and resale costs. 22o In sum,
these calculations provide a nearly comprehensive cost-benefit
analysis of affordable modification versus foreclosure. Moreover,
these calculations condense the analysis into a coherent numerical
output: modification value and foreclosure value.
Where modification value is equal to or greater than foreclosure
value, courts should invoke the duty to protect absent investors by
obligating servicers to demonstrate how foreclosure benefits
investors, based on a rebuttable presumption that foreclosure is
inequitable to investors. To overcome this presumption, servicers
must (1) show . that the borrower has refused a reasonable
modification offer or (2) affirmatively demonstrate to the court that
additional factors weigh sufficiently in favor of foreclosure. Absent
sufficient rebuttal of pro-modification NPV analysis, courts should
not allow servicers to push a case to foreclosure.
One issue that courts may have to address is conflict regarding
the terms of modification. Even when NPV favors modification, the
borrower and servicer may still disagree about the terms the
modification will take. Servicers and borrowers may estimate the
borrower's earning capacity differently and therefore disagree as to
what modified terms are required to render the loan affordable.
Judges can sidestep this issue by leaving the negotiation to the
parties. Judges need only require that the servicer demonstrate that
there is no reasonable modification with an NPV greater than
foreclosure before allowing the foreclosure to proceed. If the servicer
cannot overcome this burden, then it will be forced to negotiate with
218. See HAMP SPECIFICATIONS, supra note 209, at 4.
219. Id. at 2-3; HAMP MODEL DOCUMENTATION, supra note 210, at 9-18.
220. HAMP SPECIFICATIONS, supra note 209, at 3.
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the borrower. Likewise, a borrower will risk foreclosure by refusing
to accept a reasonable modification offer.
State courts have generally failed to require mortgage servicers
to demonstrate the objective basis for their litigation decisions.
However, implementing such a requirement would involve little
more than importing the traditional judicial function of protecting the
interests of absent stakeholders into the context of foreclosure on
securitized mortgages.221 Judges need not invent new doctrine, they
need merely apply doctrine that is already widely recognized and
established. Moreover, in the HAMP NPV calculation, judges have a
widely used, preexisting method of objective analysis to implement
this doctrine effectively, narrowly, and consistently.
C. Caveats and Responses to Counterarguments
This proposal's focus on absent stakeholders limits its
applicability to cases in which mortgages have been securitized and
sold to investors. In cases where the mortgage servicer is a subsidiary
of the same financial institution that owns the mortgage, there is no
absent stakeholder in need of protection; the mortgage servicer is
institutionally identical to the investor.22 2 Further, this proposal will
likely be useful only in a housing market affected by a macroshock
that has severely depressed housing prices.2 23 In a stable housing
market, there are instances in which the disparity between
modification value and foreclosure value weighs so heavily in favor
of modification because the value of mortgage debt generally
corresponds to the value the mortgage holder can recover through a
foreclosure sale.
Beyond these qualifications, some analysts question the
empirical accuracy of data indicating huge losses to investors from
foreclosure and argue that additional economic factors bring
investors' interests into alignment with servicers' foreclosure bias.
221. In most (but not all) cases, the mortgage servicer does not represent its own interest in
the mortgage. This Article focuses on securitized mortgages in which the mortgage holder is a
trustee to a diverse set of investors absent from the litigation. Where a mortgage servicer is also
the mortgage holder, then an absent-stakeholder analysis would not apply.
222. However, about 90 percent of mortgages originated in recent years have been
securitized. Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 24, at 1081.
223. See Piskorski et al., supra note 113, at 12, 31 (noting that macro shocks to the housing
market create value for investors in modification and that the erosion of housing prices prevents
borrowers from avoiding foreclosure through refinancing).
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Since this Article's proposal relies on empirical indications that
servicers are neglecting investors' best economic interests, it is
necessary to consider and respond to these criticisms.
1. What If Foreclosure-Not Modification-Is in the
Best Interests of Investors?
In a pair of recent studies, Kristopher Gerardi, Paul Willen,
Christopher Foote, and Lorenz Goette ("Gerardi and Willen") 224
argue that servicers rarely modify mortgages because the costs of
modification are higher, and the benefits smaller, than other analysts
have assumed. 225 Gerardi and Willen admit that mass modification
may be in the best interests of society in general, but specifically
questions whether it is in the best interests of investors. 226 To this
end, Gerardi and Willen compare modification rates between
securitized mortgages, which are mostly managed by mortgage
servicers, and mortgages held in portfolio,227 which are owned by
investment banks rather than securitized and sold on the secondary
market.228
Gerardi and Willen's hypothesis is that modification should
occur at noticeably higher rates among mortgages held in portfolio if
indeed modifications are in the best interests of investors.229 Instead,
Gerardi and Willen find that modification occurs at a slightly but not
substantially higher rate for mortgages held in portfolio compared to
mortgages that have been securitized. 230 Gerardi and Willen conclude
that this casts serious doubt on the proposition that investors' best
interests are served by modification.23 1
Gerardi and Willen suggest that hesitation to modify may simply
be due to the fact that, in the aggregate, modification entails greater
losses than foreclosure.23 2 According to Gerardi and Willen, two
224. Adelino et al., supra note 129; Foote et al., supra note 27. This nomenclature is adopted
for ease of reference and because Kristopher Girardi and Paul Willen co-authored both studies.
225. Adelino et al., supra note 129, at 2-8; Foote et al., supra note 27, at 1-3.
226. See Foote et al., supra note 27, at 2-3.
227. Id. at 27-32.
228. See Mortgage Reference Library: Portfolio Loan, http://www.brokeroutpost.com/
reference/19613.htm (last visited June 4, 2010).
229. See Foote et al., supra note 27, at 27.
230. Id. at 30, 48 tbl.8.
231. Id. at 34-35.
232. Id. at 24-25.
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hidden costs may weigh against modification and in favor of
foreclosure. 233 First, modification may superfluously reduce loan
value in a percentage of cases. Up to 30 percent of borrowers in
default, according to Gerardi and Willen, bring their loans current
prior to foreclosure without modification.234 Modification involves a
"self-cure risk"23 5 by providing a discount to borrowers who might
find ways to afford their original, non-discounted loans.
Second, Gerardi and Willen argue that risk of borrower redefault
after modification makes modification more costly than many
assume.236 If a borrower in default receives a modification but
defaults again six months later, investors may recover less from the
ultimate foreclosure. General housing prices may have fallen further
and the borrower, anticipating redefault, may not have been
motivated to maintain the property.2 37 To bolster this interpretation of
the data, Gerardi and Willen calculate that investor losses on
foreclosed mortgage-backed securities relative to affordable
modification total as much as $180 billion.238 Gerardi and Willen are
skeptical that rational investors would passively accept such massive
losses and therefore conclude that other analysts must be overlooking
additional factors that reduce the benefits of modification.239
Gerardi and Willen's theoretical observations merit
consideration in the debate about the efficacy of mortgage
modification in mitigating the foreclosure crisis. Because state courts
would run a cost-benefit analysis on a case-by-case basis, however, it
is irrelevant whether modification is more or less expensive to
investors than foreclosure on average. Courts should permit
foreclosure litigation when the NPV calculation shows that it is in
the best interests of investors. From the perspective of state courts,
Gerardi and Willen's hypotheses therefore amount to little more than
a prediction about the number of foreclosures courts will identify as
233. See Adelino et al., supra note 129, at 7.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See id. at 19. According to Gerardi and Willen, the redefault rate is between 20 and 50
percent. Id.
237. Id. at 7.
238. Foote et al., supra note 27, at 23. This estimation is based on an assumption that
approximately 1.5 million foreclosures can be prevented through modification and that each
preventable foreclosure produces a $120,000 loss to investors. Id.
239. See id. at 2.
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being against the best interests of investors. Further, there are reasons
to question the extent to which self-cure risk and redefault risk
influence the cost-benefit analysis of modification for investors.
First, as Gerardi and Willen acknowledge, most modifications
do not reduce principal.240 In fact, most modifications increase
principal because arrears are recalculated into the mortgage debt.24 ' If
most modifications do not reduce loan principal, then the risk of self-
cure is illusory-borrowers will pay no less for the loan than they
would have otherwise.242 Further, Gerardi and Willen do not
adequately address the possibility that borrowers who self-cure are
themselves at risk of redefault. All else being equal, the probability
of redefault for a borrower who receives a modification is a fortiori
the same or greater for a borrower who self-cures without the benefit
of modified loan terms. Gerardi and Willen's methodology implicitly
suggests this point. Gerardi and Willen define "cure" as a loan that is
"either current, 30-days delinquent, or prepaid after 12 months
following the first 60-day delinquency."243 Under Gerardi and
Willen's formulation, a loan is considered "cured" even if it is
currently thirty days delinquent. Self-cure risk is nonexistent if a
borrower "cures" only to redefault because the loan is unaffordable
without modification. The alleged benefits to investors of avoiding
self-cure risk are therefore partially canceled out. Also, Gerardi and
Willen's data is not based on modifications made according to the
HAMP waterfall or similar formula.
Second, the risks of redefault and self-cure are already factored
into NPV calculations as currently formulated under HAMP
guidelines. 244 Assuming that foreclosure value and modification
value are otherwise equivalent in a particular borrower's case,
factoring in redefault risk and self-cure risk will tilt the NPV
calculation to favor foreclosure, not modification. The NPV
calculation therefore contains and minimizes the risks to investors of
240. Id. at 28.
241. Id.; see also White, supra note 28, at 1114.
242. See White, supra note 28, at 1114. Some modifications involve a minor reduction in
interest rate to offset monthly payment increases caused by capitalization of arrears. See id at
1116-17.
243. Adelino et al., supra note 129, at 19.
244. See HAMP MODEL DOCUMENTATION, supra note 210, at 5, 15. Gerardi and Willen
acknowledge that many proponents of aggressive modification schemes already factor in
redefault risk. Adelino et al., supra note 129, at 7 n.9.
1425
6 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA W REVIEW
self-cure and redefault, even if it does not eliminate these risks
completely.
Third, to run Gerardi and Willen's theoretical assumptions in
reverse, for foreclosure to be preferable to modification in the
aggregate, the risk of self-cure and redefault must be so great as to
exceed the roughly $180 billion in losses investors purportedly stand
to lose from foreclosure relative to modification. Unfortunately,
Gerardi and Willen do not provide direct empirical data on the costs
of redefault and self-cure, so it is difficult to determine how heavily
these factors weigh in a cost-benefit analysis.
Finally, Gerardi and Willen's conclusion is partly based on the
finding that lenders who hold mortgages in portfolio do not modify
at a substantially higher rate than servicers of securitized
mortgages.24 5 Gerardi and Willen argue that this may be explained by
the fact that investors crave liquidity: "[I]nvestors, especially in a
time when liquidity is highly valued, may be less patient than society
as a whole, and therefore foreclose when society would prefer
renegotiation."246 In other words, if an investor faces financial
difficulty or could put cash to immediate use in other opportunities,
then it makes sense to prefer foreclosure despite losses relative to
modification because foreclosure will free up cash immediately.
However, it is unclear that foreclosure provides the same short-
term liquidity benefits to securities investors as it does to lending
institutions holding mortgages in portfolio. For an institution holding
a mortgage portfolio, liquidation requires foreclosure or assignment
of the mortgage. For an individual investor, liquidation only requires
selling her securities. It is therefore possible that the similarity in
modification rates between servicers of securitized mortgages and
lenders holding mortgages in portfolio is coincidental. Lenders with
portfolios may prefer foreclosure to access liquidity, while investors
in mortgage-backed securities may prefer modification yet be
stymied by servicers.
Furthermore, the results of studies on the existence and
magnitude of servicer foreclosure bias are equivocal. In a separate
study using the same mortgage data set,247 Tomasz Piskorski, Amit
245. See Adelino et al., supra note 129, at 14; Foote et al., supra note 27, at 30, 48 tbl.8.
246. Adelino et al., supra note 129, at 8.
247. Piskorski et al., supra note 113, at 30.
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Seru, and Vikrant Vig ("Piskorski, Seru, and Vig") reach a different
conclusion than Gerardi and Willen about servicer foreclosure bias.248
Critically, Piskorski, Seru, and Vig striate analysis of the data
according. to initial borrower creditworthiness. 249 Thus, while
Piskorski, Seru, and Vig find no consistent differences in foreclosure
rates between portfolio loans and securitized loans for loans with the
worst initial credit quality, portfolio loans of medium and highest
credit quality suffered foreclosure rates 7.4 percent and 9.2 percent
lower, respectively, than securitized loans.250
In addition, Piskorsi, Seru, and Vig find that bank-held loans
were subject to much more aggressive forms of modification with
lower rates of redefault. 251' During the first quarter of 2009, the ratio
of portfolio loan to securitized loan modifications with principal
write-downs was more than one thousand to one,252 indicating that
portfolio lenders perceive investment value in modification that
servicers of securitized mortgages do not.253 Interpreting these
findings, Piskorski, Seru, and Vig conclude that "securitization has
imposed renegotiation frictions that have resulted in a higher
foreclosure rate than would be desired by investors," and that "some
investors could have benefited if their loans were serviced similarly
to portfolio loans."25 4 These results are significant because the
majority of recent foreclosure starts255 and completed sales involved
medium-credit-quality Alt-A loans and high-quality prime loans,
likely due to record rates of unemployment. 256 The Piskorski, Seru,
and Vig study thus lends empirical support to the existence of
248. Id.
249. Id. at 3.
250. Id. at 16-17.
251. Id. at 28 & n.44.
252. See id. (noting that data on Q1 of 2009 indicates that portfolio lenders wrote down
principal in more than 3,300 mortgages, while servicers of securitized loans wrote down principal
for only three mortgages).
253. See id. at30.
254. See id. at 30-31.
255. "Foreclosure start" refers to a loan entering the foreclosure process and typically
includes loans that have been delinquent for more than ninety days. See Shane M. Sherlund, Bd.
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Mortgage Defaults 6 (2010), available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital-assets/others/infocus/foreclosure resource.center/moremort
gage-defaults.pdf.
256. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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servicer foreclosure bias and indicates that overcoming servicer bias
has the potential to avert substantial economic harm to investors.
Even assuming that risk of redefault and self-cure substantially
reduce modification value to investors, as Gerardi and Willen claim,
courts protecting absent investors should simply adjust NPV
calculations accordingly. If Gerardi and Willen are right and the
number of cases in which NPV calculations favor modification is
small, then implementing a judicial duty to protect absent investors
would impose some unnecessary administrative burdens on courts
and litigants. However, if Gerardi and Willen's predictions are
incorrect and the number of cases in which modification would
benefit investors is large, then this Article's proposal has the
potential to prevent massive economic waste, ease foreclosure
dockets, and mitigate the foreclosure crisis. On balance, these
potential benefits outweigh modestly higher administrative costs.
2. If Modification Is in the Best Interests of Investors,
Why Have More Investors Not Filed Lawsuits Against
Mortgage Servicers to Compel Modification?
As mentioned supra, the failure to prevent foreclosure through
affordable modification threatens investors in mortgage-backed
securities with a total economic loss of $180 billion.257 Given this
massive loss figure, it seems natural to assume that investors would
be flooding courts to compel servicers to modify more mortgages.
Yet there has been almost no such litigation.258 Gerardi and Willen
imply that the absence of investor-servicer litigation is circumstantial
evidence that modification is not in the best interests of investors
because rational investors faced with these massive losses would
take action to avoid this sub-optimal outcome.2 59
While it is worth investigating, the lack of investor-servicer
litigation is insufficient by itself to support the inference that
257. See Foote et al., supra note 27, at 23. This estimation is based on an assumption that
approximately 1.5 million foreclosures can be prevented through modification, and that each
preventable foreclosure produces a $120,000 loss to investors. Id.
258. See Adelino et al., supra note 129, at 4 (noting that "of the more than 800 lawsuits filed
by investors in subprime mortgages through the end of 2008, not one involved the right of a
servicer to modify a loan").
259. See Foote et al., supra note 27, at 23-24.
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investors prefer foreclosure to modification. 260 The foreclosure crisis
is an epically sub-optimal economic outcome for virtually all players
in the mortgage market, so idealized assumptions about rational
investor conduct are inadequate to explain current market behavior.26 1
Moreover, the absence of investor-servicer litigation is ambiguous.
Gerardi and Willen interpret the ambiguity to mean that investors
prefer foreclosure and are silently but attentively allowing servicers
to pursue foreclosure on investors' behalf. Alternatively, the absence
of litigation could imply that servicers are successfully exploiting the
fact that investors are not well positioned to evaluate and challenge
servicer behavior.
Servicers are necessary in the mortgage securitization process
precisely because disconnected investors are unable to collectively
manage mortgages.2 62 Investor dispersion thus creates a collective
action problem with respect to initiating litigation against a mortgage
servicer. Assuming arguendo that investors in a mortgage pool would
benefit in the aggregate from legal action, the cost of litigation
against a servicer who pursued modification would likely outweigh
any benefits for an individual investor. No single investor would find
litigation worthwhile without collective action and funding by a large
number of investors.2 63 Coordinating collective action among
investors involves a prohibitive cost-allocation problem. No
individual investor is likely to shoulder the costs of organizing and
leading a cohort of investors in litigation. The fact that modification
has the effect of benefiting some tranches of investors while costing
others diminishes the pool of investors available for recruitment. Re-
securitization adds an additional layer of investor diffusion and
further complicates coordination.2" Rather than grapple with these
difficult and costly obstacles in pursuit of uncertain gains in
260. Without more, this argument is circular. The argument asserts that modification is not in
the best interests of investors because investors have not sued to compel modification, and that
investors have not sued servicers to compel modification because modification is not in the best
interests of investors.
261. See generally Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000).
262. See supra notes 26-27, 11l and accompanying text.
263. One exception to this might be when one investor owns a disproportionately large share
of the securities in a mortgage pool. In such a case, it is plausible that the cost of litigating would
not outweigh potential gains to the individual investor.
264. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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litigation, investors dissatisfied with the performance of their
securities are likely to consider a much simpler set of options: accept
losses as part of the risk inherent in investing, or sell the securities to
someone else.
V. CONCLUSION
State courts did not cause the foreclosure crisis, nor do they
possess a cure for all the foreclosure problems currently afflicting the
mortgage lending system. However, at critical points in the
foreclosure process, state courts can channel foreclosure cases into
modification. This Article has sought to demonstrate how existing
state foreclosure laws facilitate servicers' foreclosure bias, even
when economically wasteful to investors and society generally. In
response to these problems, this Article has articulated a normative
basis for state court intervention that is procedurally feasible: courts
should take advantage of existing mediation programs and NPV
analyses to require servicers to prove that foreclosure is in the best
interests of securities investors-absent stakeholders-before
permitting foreclosure to proceed.
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